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Needles, Haystacks and NextGeneration Genetic Sequencing
Teneille R. Brown†
Abstract
Genetic testing is becoming more frequent and the results more
complex. Not infrequently, genetic testing conducted for one purpose
reveals information about other features of the genome that may be of
clinical significance. These unintended findings have been referred to as
“incidental” or “secondary” findings. In 2013, the American College of
Medical Genetics (“ACMG”) recommended that clinical laboratories
inform people if their genetic analyses indicate that they have certain
secondary mutations. These mutations were selected because they
probably cause a serious disease, which is treatable, and may go
undetected. The ACMG’s recommendations galvanized critical responses by the genetics and ethics community. One of the most important
open questions concerns the scope of negligence liability for clinical
laboratories if they failed to provide any of these SFs to patients who
never requested them. To answer this question, this article argues that
while there might be an ethical or professional obligation to share
knowledge about these specific genetic mutations, laboratories should
not be subject to tort liability for failure to share secondary findings
directly with patients.
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I.

Introduction

Gone are the days of treating patients based upon their symptoms
alone. Instead, in a growing number of contexts, physicians prescribe
treatments based on an individual’s unique genetic information,
(“genotype.”).1 This is the essence of precision medicine: a bold new
frontier of innovation in health care where treatments are no longer
“one size fits all.” It is already standard-of-care for oncologists to order
a genetic test to determine which chemotherapy to use to treat smallcell lung cancer.2 If the tumor possesses epidermal growth factor
receptor (“EGFR”) genetic mutations the cancer is more likely to

1.

In contrast, treatment based on “phenotype” or the way a patient’s
symptoms manifest, has been the traditional, bread and butter of
medicine. See generally PERSONALIZED MEDICINE COALITION, THE CASE
FOR PERSONALIZED MEDICINE, 42 (4th ed. 2014).

2.

Lung Cancer Genomic Testing (EGFR, KRAS, ALK), MEMORIAL SLOAN
KETTERING CANCER CTR., https://www.mskcc.org/cancer-care/type
s/lung/diagnosis/genetic-testing (last accessed Nov. 9, 2017); What’s New
in
Non-Small
Cell
Lung
Cancer,
AM. CANCER SOCIETY,
https://www.mskcc.org/cancer-care/types/lung/diagnosis/genetictesting (last updated May 16, 2016); see generally Federico Innocenti,
Nancy J Cox & M. Eileen Dolan, Use of Genomic Information to Optimize
Cancer Chemotherapy 38 SEMIN. ONCOLOGY 186 (2012).
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respond to a chemotherapy drug called Tarceva.3 It is also common
to perform a genetic test for human leukocyte antigen before prescribing
abacavir, an HIV drug, as certain mutations predict adverse reactions
including death.4 The potential to improve treatments using genetic
information is enormous. Looking for the next genetic discovery to more
precisely treat cancers and other life-threatening diseases has resulted
in a great deal of clinical research.5
Up until recently, genetic tests were mostly used to confirm the
diagnosis of disease rather than to guide personalized treatments.
Traditional genetic tests looked for the presence or absence of mutational “hotspots.”6 Often doctors needed to know what they were
looking for, and roughly where it was in the genome, and the test would
tell you whether the disease-causing mutation was present. This is how
genetic tests for Sickle Cell, Cystic Fibrosis, and many other common
genetic diseases have worked for decades.7
This all changed with the advent of next-generation genetic sequencing. One no longer needs to have a needle in mind. Tests can now
search the entire haystack to see if there is anything of interest
anywhere. While much is lost in resolution and validity, much is gained
in scope. So-called “next generation whole genome sequencing,” or
simply “WGS” can decode three billion base pairs or the complete DNA
sequence of an organism’s genome with one tissue or blood sample.8
Sequencing a genome used to be done manually, but the process has
become more automated and therefore much faster, thus being labeled

3.

Yongsheng Wang, Gerlad Schimd-Bindert, & Caicun Zhou, Erlotinib in
the Treatment of Advanced Non-Small Cell Lung Cancer: An Update for
Clinicians, 4 THERAPEUTIC ADVANCES IN MED. ONCOLOGY 19, 26 (2011).

4.

Ana Alfirevic and Munir Pirmohamed, Genomics of Adverse Drug
Reactions, 38 TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL SCIENCES 100, 101-102
(2017)[hereinafter Alfirevic].

5.

ClinicallTrials.gov., U.S. NAT’L LIBRARY OF MED., https://clinicaltrials.gov
(last visited Feb. 24, 2018)(search “genetic samples” under “other terms”
field).

6.

Sara Huston Katsanis & Nicholas Katsanis, Molecular Genetic Testing
and the Future of Clinical Genomics, 14 NATURE REV. GENETICS 415, 417
(2013) and see
GENEWIZ, https://www.genewiz.com/en/Public
/Services/Next-Generation-Sequencing/Targeted-ResequencingPanels/Cancer-Panels/Hot-Spot-Cancer-Panels (last visited Mar. 15,
2018) (“Hotspot cancer panels target regions of known cancer genes that
have been well-characterized as mutational hotspots.”).

7.

Id.; Philippa Brice, James Jarrett, & Miranda Mugford, Genetic
Screening for Cystic Fibrosis: An Overview of the Science and the
Economics 6 J. CYSTIC FIBROSIS 255, 256 (2007).

8.

Next Generation Sequencing, GENEWIZ, https://www.genewiz.com/en/
Public/Resources/Sample-Submission-Guidelines/Next-GenerationSequencing-Sample-Submission-Guidelines (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).
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the “next generation.”9 In humans, this means that the chromosomal,
and mitochondrial DNA, may be rapidly sequenced.10 When WGS first
hit the scene, the process was prohibitively expensive so it was only
used in well-funded laboratories as demonstration projects. But that is
no longer the case. The price has dropped to about $1500 per sample,
so WGS is more commonly used in clinical research and treatment.11
But it is not yet standard-of-care because insurance usually does not
cover it.12 WGS takes longer than other methods and yields a complex
range of tricky-to-interpret results. Such results vary from those that
predict risk for simple Mendelian diseases—caused by single genes—to
those that implicate common, risk alleles with small effect sizes for
multi-gene traits (caused by multiple genes).13
Rather than employing expensive WGS, more clinicians use wholeexome sequencing as a cheaper and faster alternative.14 Whole exome
sequencing (“WES”) sequences only exons: the portions of a person’s
genome that code for proteins or peptides.15 The exons represent only
two percent of the genome but account for roughly eighty-five percent
of the mutations that increase the risk of disease.16 Clinical use of WES
is rising in two contexts: cancer research17 and assisting patients on
9.

Sam Behjati and Patrick S. Tarpey, What is Next Generation
Sequencing?, 98 ARCH. DIS. CHILD EDUC. PRACT. ED. 236, 236 (2013).

10.

See Carla Van El, et al., Whole-Genome Sequencing in Health Care:
Recommendations of the European Society of Human Genetics, 21 EURO.
J. HUM. GENET. 580, 582 (2013).

11.

See How it Works, SCIENCE EXCHANGE, https://www.scienceexchange
.com/services/whole-genome-seq (last visited June 28, 2017).

12.

Cigna Issues Coverage Criteria for Whole-Exome Sequencing; WGS Still
Not Covered, GENOMEWEB (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.genomeweb.co
m/sequencing-technology/cigna-issues-coverage-criteria-whole-exomesequencing-wgs-still-not-covered [hereinafter GenomeWeb]; The Cost of
Sequencing a Human Genome, NAT’L. HUMAN GENOME RES. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/275651098/the-cost-of-sequencing-a-humangenome/ (last updated July 6, 2016).

13.

Jason Vassy et al., The Impact of Whole-Genome Sequencing on the
Primary Care and Outcomes of Healthy Adult Patients, 167 ANN.
INTERNAL MED. 159, 159 (2017) [hereinafter Vassy].

14.

GENOMEWEB, supra note 12.

15.

Lauren Westerfield, The Use of Whole Exome Sequencing to Detect Novel
Genetic Disorders: Two Cases and an Assessment of the Technology, 2
(2013)(dissertation, University of Pittsburgh).

16.

Julie Steenhuysen, As Sequencing Moves Into Clinical Use, Insurers Balk,
REUTERS (June 19, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-healthsequencing-insight-idUSKBN0EU16S20140619.

17.

WES is more common in cancer research, such as The Cancer Genome
Atlas (TCGA), Stand Up To Cancer (SU2C) and other studies seeking to
discover genotypes associated with particular tumors. Hanna Rennert et
al., Development and Validation of a Whole-exome Sequencing Test for
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diagnostic odysseys.18 If the laboratory finds something interesting
through WGS or WES, laboratories can, and should, confirm whether
the result is a false positive or false negative through a more validated,
targeted genetic test.19
These next-generation genetic analyses present novel questions for
ordering physicians and laboratories.20 Because physicians do not need
to know what to look for before using WGS or WES, physicians can
cast a wide net. Before, if a child presented symptoms of cystic fibrosis
(CF), the physician ordered a specific genetic test to confirm whether
the CF mutation was present. The laboratory took a blood sample, ran
the cystic-fibrosis test, and confirmed the results.21 But now—with one
blood sample—the clinical laboratory can scan a genome or exome
looking for thousands of other mutations.22 Maybe the symptoms are
caused by something the physician never considered? Maybe there is
an interesting mutation, but its presence is too rare to say it’s diseasecausing?
WGS or WES invite a huge data dump. This data dump can come
in various forms, depending on the way the lab reports its data. It can
include preliminary information on many diseases for which the patient
shows no symptoms and which were not related to the reason the
physician ordered the test.23 Instead of hearing that a child does or does
not have cystic fibrosis, a parent might also learn that the child is at
risk for developing early-onset Alzheimer’s or colon cancer. These
additional mutations are called “secondary findings,” because they are
Simultaneous Detection of Point Mutations, Indels and Copy-number
Alterations for Precision Cancer Care, 1 GENOMIC MED. 16019, 16019
(2016).
18.

S.L. Sawyer, Utility of Whole‐exome Sequencing for Those Near the End
of the Diagnostic Odyssey: Time to Address Gaps in Care, Clinical
Genetics, 89 CLIN. GENET. 275, 275-284, 279 (2016) (The study, using
WES had a higher diagnostic rate for Ciliopathy, metabolic and neurodevelopmental disorders, and dysmorphic syndromes.).

19.

Rachel L. Goldfeder et al., Medical Implications of Technical Accuracy in
Genome Sequencing, 8 GENOME MED. 9 (2016).

20.

For purposes of this paper, I am restricting my analysis to labs that are
subject to the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988
(CLIA) as they are clinical labs that examine “materials derived from the
human body for the purpose of providing information for the diagnosis,
prevention, or treatment of any disease or impairment of, or the
assessment of the health of, human beings.” see 42 U.S.C. § 263a (2017).

21.

Carrier Testing for Cystic Fibrosis, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., https://w
ww.cff.org/What-is-CF/Testing/Carrier-Testing-for-Cystic-Fibrosis/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2018).

22.

Clinical Whole Exome Sequencing Information and FAQ, N.Y. GENOME
CTR., http://www.nygenome.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/NYGCClinical-Whole-Exome-Sequencing.pdf, 12 (last updated Jan. 27, 2016).

23.

Id. at 7.
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discovered incidentally to the primary target of the test.24 While
secondary findings are possible with all types of genetic testing, they
are significantly more likely with WES and WGS due to the volume of
data analyzed.25
This article addresses whether the tort law of negligence imposes
any obligation on the laboratory to disclose genetic-risk information
that is secondary to the primary reason for ordering the test, a
“secondary finding” or (SF).26 Whether there is a legal duty to warn is
a threshold question for the judge to apply to similar future cases. Thus,
before answering case-specific questions about whether there is a breach
of the standard of care or whether the breach actually and proximately
caused the patient’s injury, there must be a duty. This article will
proceed in two parts. First, it introduces the topic and the professional
obligations imposed by the American College of Medical Genetics
(“ACMG”). Second, it discusses the common-law factors courts
routinely use when deciding whether to impose an affirmative duty to
warn. The article argues against imposing this kind of duty on clinical
laboratories.

II. Much Depends on How the Complaint is Framed
Whether a judge will find that the laboratory has a particular duty
will depend a great deal on how the patient frames his or her complaint.
What sort of duty is being alleged? Is the plaintiff arguing that the
defendant acted carelessly, or that the defendant did not act at all?
These distinctions matter a great deal and make it impossible to answer
the question of liability in the abstract. The outcome also depends on
24.

Secondary findings are not new to medicine. Analogous scenarios have
developed in radiology and pathology, where clinicians discovered tumors
and disease that were adjacent to the region of primary interest. Clinical
Sequencing Exploratory Research, Medically Actionable or Secondary or
Incidental Results, AM. SOC’Y OF HUM. GENETICS, https://www.as
hg.org/education/csertoolkit/medicallyactionable.html (last visited Mar.
1, 2018).See also Robert C. Green et al., ACMG Recommendations for
Reporting of Incidental Findings in Clinical Exam and Genome
Sequencing, 15 GENETICS IN MED. 565, 568 (2013) (“In clinical exome and
genome sequencing, there is potential for the recognition and reporting of
incidental or secondary findings unrelated to the indication for ordering
the sequencing but of medical value for patient care.”).

25.

Madhuri Hegde et al, Reporting Incidental Findings in Genomic Scale
Clinical Sequencing – a Clinical Laboratory Perspective, 17 J. MOLECULAR
DIAG. 107, 109-10 (2015).

26.

The ensuing factors and analysis could be applied to a mutation of
uncertain present clinical value, “dubbed a variant of unknown
significance” or (VUS), but this will not be the focus of this paper. This
article relates to the question of imposing a tort duty to disclose the
results, and the analysis of returning VUS hinges more on the analysis of
breach, and whether return of these types of results falls below the
standard of care for laboratories.
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whether the plaintiff has brought a wrongful-death claim or a “lost
chance” claim, for the loss of a better clinical outcome, because a
medical diagnosis was delayed. Courts treat each type of negligence
differently depending on the alleged duty and injury. Because this
article seeks to provide practical, concrete guidance to judges, it will
address a particular question: whether a laboratory should have
disclosed a mutation directly to the patient. While some fact-specific
questions arise in this context, a proper analysis of duty should proceed
more in-abstractly, without wading too deep in the particulars of any
case.
This article envisions one a very narrow type of duty-to-warn claim
where the patient sues the laboratory for not providing SFs to the
patient, and as a result, the patient failed to pursue a clinical intervention that they would have otherwise taken had they known of the
genetic risk. If the laboratory returns some SFs to the plaintiff, but
provides substandard information about the clinical significance of
those findings, then this event might be framed as a more traditional
negligence claim and the operative question will be whether the lab
breached its duty by falling below the standard of care. The defendant
acted in disclosing the SF, but just did not act appropriately.
In any negligence action, the plaintiff states in her complaint what
exactly the breach of the duty was and how performance of this duty
would have prevented the injury for which she seeks compensation. She
must prove each of four elements—duty, breach, causation, and
injury—to prevail.27 In some cases, a duty to contact or warn might be
imposed because it requires little of defendants.28 In the context of
genetic sequencing, a plaintiff might allege that the lab has a duty to
send all genetic-testing results, including those from exome sequencing,
to the ordering provider. But if imposing this duty is unlikely to prevent
the harm the plaintiff suffered from a delayed diagnosis—because, for
example, there is evidence that the physician would not understand or
use the information to change the patient’s treatment in a way that
would have prevented her injury—then a breach of this duty cannot
have caused plaintiff’s harm.29 Each of the elements of a negligence
claim must align with one another, such that the duty imposed, if

27.

See Blue Ridge Service Corp of VA v. Saxon Shoes, 624 S.E.2d 55, 62
(Va. 2006).

28.

PETER M. GERHART, TORT LAW AND SOCIAL MORALITY, 133-134 (2000).

29.

Assuming there is a duty, to see how causation operates in these types of
cases, see, Kaffka v. N.Y. Hosp., 228 A.D.2d 332, 333 (1996) (“Expert
testimony that Dr. Minick delayed diagnosis of cancer does not establish
causation when uncontested evidence shows that, by the time of his
examination, Mrs. Kaffka’s cancer had already metastasized to the bone
and liver, tragically sealing her fate.”).
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performed up to the standard of care, would have likely prevented the
particular injury alleged.30

III. The American College of Medical Genetics Report
As soon as the inevitability of SFs emerged with next-generation
sequencing, scholars began asking what obligations physicians,
laboratories, and researchers might have to report these findings to
patients and their relatives.31 Researchers have suggested that there
might be ethical—and perhaps legal—duties to warn patients of
particular mutations, specifically if the mutations are known to be
disease-causing (“pathogenic”), are quite likely to develop (“highly
penetrant”), and effective treatments are available (“clinically actionable”). While amendments to the HIPAA Privacy Rule clarified that
research subjects can request raw sequencing research results from
CLIA-certified clinical laboratories,32 the question remains about
whether the labs might have an affirmative obligation to provide SFs
to patients, or research subjects, who never affirmatively requested
them.
In 2013, a working group of the ACMG published a muchanticipated list of fifty-six SFs that clinical diagnostic laboratories
performing exome or genome sequencing should report to patients.33 The
working group—comprised of sixteen clinical lab directors and
respected geneticists—explicitly avoided making legal recommendations
30.

See Robert F. Schopp and Michael R. Quattrocchi, Tarasoff, the Doctrine
of Special Relationship, and the Psychotherapist’s Duty to Warn, 12 J.
PSYCHIATRY & L.13, 16 (1984).

31.

See Catherine Gliwa and Ben Berkman, Do Researchers Have an
Obligation to Actively Look for Genetic Incidental Findings?, 13 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 32, 35-36 (2013); see Holly Tabor et al., Genomics Really Gets
Personal: How Exome and Whole Genome Sequencing Challenge the
Ethical Framework of Human Genetics Research, 155 AM. J. MED.
GENETICS 2916, 2924 (2011); see Wylie Burke, et al., Recommendations
for returning genomic incidental findings? We need to talk!, 15 GENETICS
IN MED. 854, 854-57(2013); Joon-Ho Yu et al., Attitudes of Genetics
Professionals Toward the Return of Incidental Results from Exome and
Whole-Genome Sequencing, 95 AM. J. HUMAN GENETICS 77, 84 (2014)
[hereinafter Yu 2014]; Susan M. Wolf, Jordan Paradise, and Charlisse
Cagaanan, The Law of Incidental Findings in Human Subjects Research,
36 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 361, 362-63, 365 (2008).

32.

45 C.F.R. §493.1291 (2016). HHS’s amendments to the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (“HIPAA”) Privacy Rule and
the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988 (CLIA)
regulations require laboratories in HIPAA covered entities that process
research results to provide the results to research subjects upon request.

33.

See Green RC, et al., American College of Medical Genetics and
Genomics. ACMG recommendations for reporting of incidental findings
in clinical exome and genome sequencing. 15 GENET MED 565, 570 (2013)
[hereinafter Green].
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and instead emphasized that the guidance was meant as an “educational resource for medical geneticists and other health care providers to
help them provide quality medical genetic services.”34 Professional
guidelines can inform legal standards, and so this report renewed
interest in whether there might also be tort liability for failure to
provide certain SFs to patients. While the initial ACMG report
recommended disclosing SFs even when the DNA samples came from
children35 and where the patients expressed no interest in learning this
information, the ACMG later changed the recommendation to permit
patients to opt out of being given their results.36
The working group focused on the low-hanging fruit.37 Quite sensibly, it limited its recommendation to the mutations that were simplest
to interpret and classify: single-gene mutations known to increase the
risk of developing serious disease.38 It deferred answering whether there
might be an obligation to return results that are less predictable and
more ambiguous. In addition to being amenable to preventative clinical
measures or treatment, other factors weighed in favor of disclosure in
the ACMG report, for example, that the mutations were: highly
penetrant, known to be pathogenic, verifiable by other diagnostic
methods, somewhat more common than other monogenic disorders, and
had clinical presentations that meant they otherwise might escape
detection for long periods of time.39
Applying these criteria, based on clinical guidance and some
emerging data, the working group initially decided that fifty-six SFs
should be disclosed. The report acknowledged that the list should be
curated as we gather more population and risk data.40 Specifically, the
34.

See id.

35.

One thing that the ACMG recommendations got right from a tort duty
perspective is that legally it makes no difference whether the samples came
from kids or adults. If the risk of harm from not disclosing is foreseeable,
then the lab would have a duty that would extend to children. See
Foreseeable Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.us
legal.com/f/foreseeable/ (last visited Nov. 26, 2017).

36.

Green, supra note 32, at 569.

37.

One thing that the ACMG recommendations got right from a tort duty
perspective is that legally it makes no difference whether the samples came
from kids or adults. If the risk of harm from not disclosing is foreseeable,
then the lab would have a duty that would extend to children. See
Foreseeable Law and Legal Definition, supra note 35.

38.

Green, supra note 32, at 569.

39.

The ACMG working group did not recommend reporting variants of
unknown significance (VUS), as they “recognized the challenge of
attempting to report and interpret variants of unknown significance as
incidental findings.” See id.

40.

See Sarah Kalia et al., Recommendations for Reporting of Secondary
Findings in Clinical Exome and Genome Sequencing, 2016 Update
(ACMG SF v2.0): A Policy Statement of the American College of Medical
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list will change as we gain information on genetic “penetrance,” or the
percentage of people who have a gene variant who go on to express or
develop the associated disease.41 Much of the data upon which the
ACMG recommendations were based relied on case reports where the
individual was already symptomatic (e.g., the individual was already
experiencing signs of the disorder).42 When laboratories start providing
SFs on samples that were tested primarily for something else, and for
individuals who had not yet developed any symptoms of the SF-linked
disease, then it is expected that penetrance will be much lower. Many
of the people who test positive for the mutation will therefore never go
on to develop the disease (or, “phenotype”).43 Because high penetrance
was a key factor leading the ACMG to include a particular mutation
on its list, the ACMG might need to remove mutations from the list
where the likelihood of an asymptomatic person developing the disease
is quite low.
Given the rapid pace of genetic discovery, it is not surprising that
just three years after its publication the original 2013 report has already
been amended.44 This second report has been referred to as “ACMG SF
Genetics and Genomics, 19 GENETICS IN MEDICINE 249, 253-54 (2017)
[hereinafter Kalia] (“We anticipate that the increasing availability of large
population databases, such as the Exome Aggregation Consortium
(ExAC), will be helpful in refining estimates of penetrance, which may
inform future curation of the ACMG SF v2.0 list” . . . incorporation of
pharmacogenomic (PGx) variants onto a SF minimum list has also been
considered [but rejected] . . . due to a lack of randomized, controlled trials
and small numbers of patients for whom PGx results are available.”).
41.

As some of the data supporting foreseeability of harm relied on case
reports where the phenotype was already present in the individual, it’s
possible that penetrance might be lower in individuals whose samples were
tested primarily for something else (and who had not yet developed the
disease). Put differently, there might be high false positives for individuals
with some of these mutations who will never develop the related diseases.
See LORI B. ANDREWS ET AL., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS: IMPLICATIONS
FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY 39 (National Academy Press, 1994).

42.

Joel Zlotogora, Penetrance and Expressivity and in the Molecular Age, 5
GENETIC MED. 347, 252 (2003).

43.

David Cooper et al., Where genotype is not predictive of phenotype:
towards an understanding of the molecular basis of reduced penetrance in
human inherited disease, 132 HUMAN GENETICS 1077, 1081 (2013) (“It is
not hard to see why reduced penetrance might be much more common
among described mutations than originally thought: whereas known
pathological mutations have almost invariably been identified through
retrospective analyses of families or well-defined groups of clinically
symptomatic patients, relatively few prospective studies of asymptomatic
carriers have so far been performed to derive estimates of penetrance.”).

44.

Based on feedback the initial report received, the ACMG solicited
revisions to the original 2013 list and reviewed those proposals. ACMG
then issued another statement in 2016 where they recommended reporting
an additional set of mutations, (and removing one that had previously
been recommended). The mutation that was removed from the
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v2.0” and added another criterion for disclosure of SFs: acceptability of
the proposed clinical intervention based on its risks and benefits.45 The
working group stated that additional genes may be analyzed and
reported if the lab deems it appropriate.46
The ACMG working group justified their recommendations because
laboratory personnel have a “fiduciary duty to prevent harm by
warning patients and their families about certain incidental findings
and that this principle supersedes concerns about autonomy.”47
Fiduciary duties stem from agency principles, as the agent is often
stepping in the shoes of the principal and should therefore assert the
latter’s best interests in a loyal and honest way.48 While it makes sense
to impose fiduciary obligations on health care providers, the lab does
not sit in such a position to the patient. In any event, it is a confusing
twist to use fiduciary principles to potentially thwart an individual’s
right to autonomy, and provide information to them that they might
not desire.49 Given that the ACMG report did expect that the lab
results would be mediated through an ordering physician and not go
directly to patients, it is peculiar that it did not place the fiduciary
obligations there with the physician.50
In March of 2014—motivated by strong condemnations that
patients should be able to opt out of the analysis of SFs—the ACMG
updated its recommendations to respect individuals’ “right not to
know” their genotype.51 The new recommendations allow patients to
recommended list was MYLK, which is associated with familial thoracic
aortic aneurysm and dissection (FTAAD). It was removed after the
ACMG SF 2.0 working group assessed the rarity of its pathogenic
variants, the inability to effectively confirm it through diagnostic testing,
and the lack of data on how effective medications are on reducing stress
on the aorta. See, Kalia, supra note 40, at250-51.
45.

SF Lucy-Enid Ding, Leslie Burnett & Douglas Chesher, The Impact of
Reporting Incidental Findings from Exome and Whole-Genome
Sequencing: Predicted Frequencies Based on Modeling, 17 GENETICS IN
MED. 197, 204 (2014)(finding that the riskier the intervention given the
benefits, the less likely the SF mutation should be reported by the lab).
Kalia, supra note 40, at 250 (studying the likelihood of SFs based on the
ACMG criteria calculated that ~2.7% (range: 1.5–6.5%) of screened
individuals would have a reportable).

46.

Green, supra note 32, at 569.

47.

Id. at 568.

48.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §8.01 (AM. LAW. INST. 2017).

49.

See Gabriel Lázaro-Muñoz, The Fiduciary Relationship Model for Managing
Clinical Genomic “Incidental” Findings, 42 J. LAW MED. ETHICS 576, 3
(2014).

50.

Green, supra note 32, at 568-70.

51.

Anastasia Richardson, Incidental Findings and Future Testing Methodologies:
Potential Application of the ACMG 2013 Recommendations, 1 J. OF L. AND
THE BIOSCIENCES 378, 381 (2014).
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indicate that they would not like to receive SFs, through an advanced
informed consent process.52 In the future, it is possible that informed
consent procedures will take care of several of the issues presented in
this article, as patients can let their physician and laboratory know
what types of SFs they would like to have disclosed.53 But as most
informed consent documents struggle to anticipate every contingency,
adequately define terms, respond to evolving clinical information, and
present information in a way that is easily understood by patients, this
dilemma over the return of SFs will not be solved by informed consent
procedures. This informed consent remedy also assumes that the institution requires some form of express consent before submitting tissue
for genetic analysis, which not all clinics do.54 Further, the duty to warn
is not coterminous with what a patient has expressly agreed to be told
in advance. The very idea that courts can impose duties through tort
law suggests that these legal obligations override what parties agree to
in advance through negotiation or contract. Tort duties exist in addition to, or instead of, contractual obligations.
In the future, interoperable medical records might help avoid this
dilemma because the lab could return the SFs to the physician and
import the data into a searchable electronic medical record. Then, at a
later encounter when the physician meets with the patient, the
physician could ask the patient whether she would like to know about
this particular SF. If warranted, the physician could also request a
consult with a genetics counselor to help the patient understand the SF
and put it in context. This technological tool would greatly assist the
transmission of SFs to patients in a responsible way. But it too falls
short of solving the present problem of whether labs might have some
affirmative duty to reach out to a non-consenting patient and offer
information regarding SFs before it becomes clinically relevant.
While the ACMG report provides some professional guidance to
clinical laboratories, it does not answer the question of whether they
might face tort liability for failing to return SFs. Ethical obligations do
not automatically create legal obligations. Applying common law principles from negligence and the duty to warn, this article concludes that
while there might be ethical obligations to return particular SFs to
patients, there should not presently be any legal obligation to do so.

52.

ACMG Board of Directors, ACMG Policy Statement: Updated Recommendations Regarding Analysis and Reporting of Secondary Findings in
Clinical Genome-Scale Sequencing, 17 GENETICS IN MED. 68, 68 (2014).

53.

Id.

54.

See A Helpful Introduction to Torts, LAWS.COM, https://tort.laws.com/to
rts (last visited March 13, 2018).
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IV. Applying The Inelegant but Flexible Law of
Negligence
Torts like negligence provide a flexible means for compensating
injured parties. But the system offers an inefficient means to ensure
patient safety and autonomy. By the time a plaintiff files suit, the
plaintiff has already suffered an injury. There are also major disincentives to filing a lawsuit, such as lost time and the emotional distress
from litigation.55 Even in the unusual case where a plaintiff is paid a
settlement or receives damages, a third of anything he or she receives
typically goes to the attorneys. Despite these shortcoming, without
political will and targeted regulation, tort law can provide some compensation and possible deterrence for careless actions.56
In Williams v. Quest Diagnostics case, a mother sued the lab after
it conducted her son’s genetic testing for Dravet’s disease under the
theory that its failure to label her son’s SCN1A mutation as diseasecausing led to his death.57 In such a case, tort law provides the only
means of compensation.58 There is no other criminal, statutory, contract
or regulatory remedy.59 It’s a tort law remedy or nothing.
In any negligence action, the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant breached a duty it owed to plaintiff, causing an injury the
law finds worthy of compensation. Essentially, a plaintiff must prove
four elements: (1) duty; (2) breach, (3) causation; and (4) injury.60 If
the plaintiff cannot prove these by the preponderance of the evidence,
she loses. And this is before a defendant raises any affirmative defenses.61
55.

See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, How Should Courts Handle Frequent Fliers?
A Trampling Incident at a Florida Wal-Mart Highlights a Dilemma,
FINDLAW (Dec. 10, 2003), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentar
y/how-should-courts-handle-frequent-filers.html.

56.

See generally A Helpful Introduction to Torts,
https://tort.laws.com/torts (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).

57.

Jennifer Wagner, Litigating the Accountability of Clinical Genomics
Laboratories, Genomics Law Report, GENOMICS L. REP., https://www.gen
omicslawreport.com/index.php/2016/05/31/litigating-the-accountabilityof-genomics-laboratories/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2018)(“More than 1250
epilepsy-causing mutations have been reported in this gene, and about
95% of patients with Dravet syndrome have de novo heterozygous
mutations (meaning the parents do not carry the mutations”).

58.

Id.

59.

See Tort, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell
.edu/wex/tort (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).

60.

See David G. Owen, The Five Elements of Negligence, 35 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1671, 1672 (2007).

61.

See Carl Barbier and Donna Phillips Currault, Fundamentals of Rule 12,
FBA NO CHAPTER (Mar. 26, 2015), http://nofba.org/wp-content/up
loads/Fundamentals-of-Rule-12.pdf.
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In the U.S., the common law of tort has traditionally emphasized
whether the defendant’s action—rather than his inaction—injured the
plaintiff.62 The law expects people to conduct themselves in reasonable
and careful ways, but the law typically did not hold defendants liable
for negligence due to inaction unless their previous action caused the
risk of harm.63 Generally, a defendant has no “duty to rescue.”64 Even
where the defendant “realizes or should realize that action on his part
is necessary for another’s aid or protection,” the Second Restatement
of Torts recognizes that this “does not of itself impose upon him a duty
to take such action.”65 Thus, a lab’s belief that disclosure could prevent
harm to a patient does not create a tort duty to disclose. The U.S. is
unusual in this regard, as most European countries impose some duty
to rescue by statute. Only three states in the U.S. have imposed, by
statute, an affirmative duty for private citizens to rescue strangers.66
Over the course of the last forty years, this sharp distinction
between action and inaction—also known as misfeasance and nonfeasance in torts parlance—has eroded. Where certain policy factors are
present, and the plaintiff stands in some “special relationship” with the
defendant, most state courts recognize that a defendant may now be
considered negligent for failing to act.67 Despite the general expansion
of the notion of duty in recent years, this expansion is not without
limits. The typical cases where courts impose an affirmative duty to
warn can be easily distinguished from the return of SFs in asym62.

See Jennifer L. Groninger, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really
Leave a Victim Lying in the Street? What is Left of the American Rule,
and Will it Survive Unabated?, 26 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 353, 376 (1999).

63.

STEVEN R. SMITH & ROBERT G. MEYER, LAW, BEHAVIOR,
HEALTH: POLICY AND PRACTICE 41 (1987).

64.

Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of A Duty to
Reasonably Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1447, 1459
(2008) (“In the midst of this more or less pervasive obligation of
reasonable precaution and care generated by the operation of negligence
law, there exists a black hole, a small void in which the duty of reasonable
care does not apply.”).

65.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (Am. L. Inst.1965).

66.

Vermont, Rhode Island, and Minnesota have enacted statutory duties to
rescue. According to David Hyman, “Vermont and Rhode Island require
individuals to perform non-risky rescues; Minnesota requires individuals
to either perform the non-risky rescue or provide notice of the problem to
police or rescue personnel. One other state, Wisconsin, has a statute that
requires persons present at the scene of a crime to either report the
incident to the police or to assist the crime victim. Several other states
have imposed limited duties to report crimes, and every state imposes a
duty to remain at the scene of a car accident at least long enough to
render aid and exchange information, when it is safe to do so.” David A.
Hyman, Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to
Rescue, 84 TEX. L. REV. 653, 683–84 (2006).

67.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (Am. L. Inst.1965).
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ptomatic individuals. The remainder of this article will address the
contexts in which courts have been willing to impose an affirmative
duty to warn.
a.

The History and Expansion of A Duty To Warn in Negligence

The threshold legal question in a negligence action is whether the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.68 And duties are about
relationships. It is typically not enough for the plaintiff to show that
the defendant owed a duty “to the world at large or to some other
person, but instead plaintiff must show that he was within a class of
persons to whom the defendant owed a duty to refrain from the
allegedly negligent or wrongful conduct.”69 As torts scholar Dean
Prosser put it, “duty . . . is a question of whether the defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff.”70 In most cases,
it is presumed that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty to take care
not to cause the type of injury that she suffered. We each owe a duty
to drive our cars carefully so as not to injure others on the road.
Contractors owe a duty to build safe houses for anyone who might use
the house. Pharmacists have a duty to the patients whose medicines
they dispense.71 It is often assumed that the defendant owes the plaintiff
a duty, so the parties do not litigate this element.72 But in cases based
on novel relationships, the question of whether the defendant owed the
particular plaintiff a duty is complex. Nowhere is this trickier than
when the law expects the defendant not to be careful when acting, but
to be careful by acting. Courts are reluctant to impose an affirmative
duty to act if the default or baseline is no action.
Whether to impose a duty is “an expression of the sum total of
those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the
particular plaintiff is entitled to protection’ against the defendant’s
conduct.”73 Unlike the other fact-dependent elements of the negligence
cause of action—determinable by juries—judges determine whether the
defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff.74 This is because the
imposition of a duty involves questions of public policy. As judges are
68.

D.E. Buckner, Comment Note- Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence
and Proximate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942, §2[a] (1965).

69.

Id.

70.

Id.

71.

John Goldberg, Anthony Sebok, and Benjamin Zipursky, TORT LAW:
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 52 (4th ed 2106).

72.

Id. at 51.

73.

Beauchene v. Synanon Foundation 88 Cal. App. 3d 342,348 (quoting
William L. Prosser, TORTS 325-26 (4th ed. 1971)); Dugard v. United
States, 835 F.3d 915, 921 (9th Cir. 2016).

74.

See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L.
REV. 1014, 1022 (1928).
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better positioned to evaluate the social costs and benefits of imposing
a duty, this responsibility falls to them.75 Of course, this gives judges
power in negligence cases. Judges can take a case away from the jury
and resolve it themselves if they decide that this class of defendants
owes no duty to this class of plaintiffs, even if the defendant caused the
plaintiff’s injury through his unreasonable behavior.76 This power might
be shocking to those who are not familiar with tort law. The recent
Third Restatement of Torts reflected a concern that judges may take
too many cases away from juries on grounds of duty and cautioned
against this. 77 Even so, courts still routinely exercise this control over
their dockets.
b.

Crucially, There is no “Special Relationship” Between the Lab and
Patient

Whether a duty exists is intimately related to the question of the
content of the duty. It is possible for a person to owe no duty of care
in one context, a minimal duty in another, and an expansive duty in a
third context.78 Much hinges on whether a special relationship exists
between the parties. If there is no special relationship, courts are
reluctant to impose broad, affirmative duties to rescue or warn.
Examples of typical “special relationships” are those of landlord/
tenant, business/customer, airplane/passenger, school/student, hotel/
guest or physician/patient.79 Tort law finds these relationships special
because the subordinated plaintiff places his or her wellbeing or safety
in the trust and control of the defendant.80 Because of the control that
the landlord, business owner, and airline operator have over access to
their apartments, businesses, and airplanes, customers cannot always
75.

See Lisa M. Nuttall, Tort Law – Foreseeability vs. Public Policy
Considerations in Determining the Duty of Physicians to Non-Patients –
Lester v. Hall, 30 N.M. L. REV. 351, 353, 359 (2000).

76.

See Stephen A. Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact
Distinction, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1867, 1867 (1966).

77.

See George W. Soule and Jacqueline M. Moen, Failure to Warn in
Minnesota, The New Restatement on Products Liability, and The
Application of the Reasonable Care Standard, 21 WILLIAM MITCHELL L.
REV. 389, 389, 392 (1995).

78.

See Jarmie v. Troncale, 50 A.3d 802, 832–34 (Conn. 2012) (citing Doe v.
Yale University, 659, 748 A.2d 834, 855 (Conn. 2000)) (type of duty
claimed can determine whether negligence claim is cognizable); Clohessy
v. Bachelor, 675 A.2d 852, 860 (Conn. 1996) (“[t]he nature of the
[defendant’s] duty, and the specific persons to whom it is owed, are
determined by the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the
individual” [internal quotation marks omitted] ).

79.

See Claire Elaine Radcliffe, A Duty to Rescue: The Good, the Bad, and
the Indifferent – The Bystander’s Dilemma, 13 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 387,
395-96 (1986).

80.

See id. at 395.
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receive help from others. With this control and power comes some
fiduciary obligations to protect the vulnerable customer. 81 A more
vulnerable and less-sophisticated plaintiff expects the more-powerful
defendant to use heightened care.82 Courts routinely apply this dynamic
to the physician/patient relationship.83
It is precisely because of the special relationship between physician
and patient that courts have imposed expansive affirmative obligations
on physicians to warn, protect, and inform patients—and even nonpatients—of foreseeable risks of harm.84 But before we can explore
whether to extend the “duty to warn” cases from physicians to
laboratories I will flush out the extent to which the relationship between
the patient and the lab is very different from the relationship between
the patient and her physician.85
The relationship between a patient and his or her clinical laboratory
is much more attenuated than the relationship between patient and
physician. Most patients never meet laboratory technicians. Hospitals
contract with different labs, such that if a patient submits two samples,
they may each go to a different entity, with a different person analyzing
their samples every time.86 Typically the ordering physician mediates
the patient’s sole interaction with the clinical lab. Patients do not have
the same intimate conversations—based on trust and expertise—that
they have with their physician. Patients do not expect loyalty from
their lab and there is certainly a much less developed canon of labor81.

See Barbara Black, Transforming Rhetoric into Reality: A Federal
Remedy for Negligent Brokerage Advice, 8 TRANSACTIONS 101, 114 (2006).

82.

See Radcliffe, supra note 79, at 396.

83.

See Roger B. Dworkin, Getting What We Should from Doctors: Rethinking
Patient Autonomy and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 13 HEALTH
MATRIX 235, 236-37 (2003).

84.

See Safer v. Pack, 291 N.J. Super. 619 (1996), Gill v. Hartford Accident
& Indem. Co., 337 So.2d 420 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Cheeks v. Dorsey,
846 So.2d 1169, 1173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Emerich v. Phila. Ctr.
for Human Dev., Inc., 720 A.2d 1032, 1037-1038 (Pa. 1998).

85.

An important question for deeper analysis elsewhere is whether a
physician who is also a researcher can disavow the strong
patient/physician relationship when he is wearing his researcher hat. The
fiduciary obligation does not disappear when the physician is conducting
research. The physician does not stop being the patient’s physician, even
if the nature of the relationship is very different, and the researcher is no
longer prioritizing the patient’s individual treatment. Even so, from the
perspective of the patient’s expectations and trust, it is likely the “special
relationship” continues to exist and can support broad, affirmative duties
to warn patient/subjects. See Donna T. Chen, et al., Clinical Research
and the Physician-Patient Relationship, 138 138 ANNALS OF INTERNAL
MED. 669, 669 (2003).

86.

Jim Gozvoda and Jeff Raasch, Hospitals Putting Their Labs in One Place,
HOSPITALS & HEALTH NETWORKS, (Aug. 11, 2007), https://www
.hhnmag.com/articles/8517-core-hospital-labs
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atory ethics governing the communications between lab and patient.87
The physician-patient relationship might be fetishized because many of
us no longer have such intimate relationships with our primary-care
doctors, let alone with specialists. But the tradition of trust, physical
custody, communicative intimacy, ethics, and the unequal power dynamic generates the kind of “special relationship” courts recognize between physicians and patients.88 These elements are not present between
a patient and the clinical laboratory.
Some may argue that a special relationship exists between the
patient and laboratory because the patient puts her tissue or blood
sample into the laboratory’s control and custody. But the law does not
demand physical control or for a special relationship to attach. And
where it is present, it is typically the custody of the whole person that
creates the kind of special relationship that imposes a heightened tort
duty.89 The bases for these protective obligations arise out of concerns
for personal safety.90 An individual’s safety is not threatened by submitting a tissue sample to a clinical laboratory.
Courts have gone to great lengths to preserve the sanctity and
clarity of physician-patient communication. For instance, courts have
refrained from imposing duties on pharmacists, ultrasonographers, and
other clinical technicians out of concern that imposing a duty on these
individuals might conflict with the physician-patient relationship or
confuse the message delivered to the patient.91 Courts have been
reluctant to require pharmacists to identify contraindications of drugs
that the physician specifically ordered, because the physician knows the
patient’s history better and is thought to be in as good of a position as
the pharmacist to identify which drugs are best for their patients.92
While pharmacists have greater interactions with patients than labs do,
courts still prefer the physician to serve as the primary clinical liaison.
Funneling reporting responsibilities through the physician ensures that
the patient does not receive conflicting communication, but it places a
great deal of responsibility on general practitioners. Some of this rea87.

See, How It Works, LABCORP, https://www.labcorp.com/help/usinglabcorp (last visited Nov. 9, 2017).

88.

Andrea Schwab, The Physician-Patient Relationship, 108 TEX. MED.
ASS’N. 48, 48 (2012).

89.

See id.

90.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
INST. 2012).

91.

See Lauren Fleischer, From Pill-Counting to Patient Care: Pharmacists’
Standard of Care in Negligence Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, at 168
(1999).

92.

Pharmacists’ Duty to Warn, NAT’L ASS’N OF CHAIN DRUG STORES,
https://www.nacds.org/pdfs/membership/duty_to_warn.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 22, 2017); JA Ansari, Drug Interaction and Pharmacist¸ 2 J.
OF YOUNG PHARMACISTS 326, 329 (2010).
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soning might stem from the “learned intermediary” doctrine in products
liability.93 Under this doctrine, the manufacturer of a drug or device
need not directly warn a patient, so long as it warned the “learned
intermediary,” a prescribing physician.94 The physician has a duty to
warn the patient and the manufacturer is not liable even where the
physician does not actually pass along the warning.95
While a laboratory may have better information as to which
mutations are actionable, highly penetrant, or lead to severe loss of
function, it must share this information with the physician, who can
translate it and place it into context for the patient. 96 Pilot data suggest
that patients can take SFs in stride and that patients and primary-care
physicians can digest such implications without unnecessarily using
health care resources or becoming distressed.97 Even if physicians need
to consult genetics counselors, physicians are still better positioned to
communicate nuance to the patients. Imposing this obligation on laboratories could interfere with physician-patient communication.
Because no “special relationship” exists between a clinical laboratory and a patient, a more nuanced analysis that considers larger policy
considerations, is necessary. This article will address those policy considerations, as they have developed through the case law. This requires

93.

See, Fleischer, supra note 91, at 168 n. 21-22 (citing Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1976)); Presto v. Sandoz
Pharms. Co., 487 S.E.2d 70, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Kirk v. Michael
Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d. 387, 395 (Ill. 1987)).

94.

See, Diane Schmauder Kane, Construction and Application of LearnedIntermediary Doctrine, 57 A.L.R.5TH 1 (1998) (“Under the circumstances
presented in the cases described below, the courts concluded that a
learned intermediary’s negligence in prescribing, administering, or
treating an injured patient was a primary, superseding cause of the
patient’s injuries, thereby severing the causal connection between the
manufacturer’s alleged inadequate warnings and the patient’s ultimate
injury.”).

95.

Carol Rooney, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: An Update, 30 TRIAL
ADVOC. Q., 6 (2010) (“The learned intermediary doctrine allows the manufacturers of prescription drugs or medical devices to defend against a
claim of failure to warn brought by an injured patient by showing that
they provided adequate warnings to the prescribing physician.”).

96.

See 42 C.F.R. §493.1291(l) (2017), and Keyan Salari, The Dawning Era
of Personalized Medicine Exposes a Gap in Medical Education, 6 PLOS
1,2 (2009).

97.

Vassy, supra note 13, at 160. However, this study was based upon a
convenience sample of 9 physicians from one network in the highlyacademic Boston environs. So even though the data are interesting, their
reassuring findings might not extrapolate to the general primary care
population, where physicians may not have the resources or knowledge to
help patients interpret the data. But we do learn from this study that the
disclosure can be a fruitful one, and does not always require the
interpretation of a genetics counselor.
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traditional legal reasoning through analogy, comparing our situation to
the cases where novel duties to warn have been imposed.

V. The Development of the Rowland Factors
In the late 1960s, beginning in California, state judges began
expanding the scope of liability by imposing new affirmative duties.
Rowland v. Christian began this shift.98 In Rowland, the plaintiff, while
visiting his friend, severed tendons in his hand while using her broken
bathroom faucet.99 He sued his friend under a common-law negligence
theory—probably because she had renter’s insurance and would not be
paying the damages herself—arguing that she knew about the broken
faucet and therefore had a duty to warn him about it.100 Before
Rowland, owners of land did not owe a duty to warn social guests of
such risks, but they did have a duty to warn people invited to their
homes for business purposes.101 Reflecting the egalitarian principles of
the era, the court emphasized that “a man’s life or limb does not become
less worthy of protection by the law” because he was a social guest and
not a business invitee.102
Rowland revolutionized the duty analysis. In recognizing a new
duty to warn social guests of concealed risks in their homes, Rowland
established the general principle “that a person is liable for injuries
caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the circumstances,”103
and no exception to this rule automatically applied when the injury
resulted from defendant’s inaction.104 Rowland could carry forward with
his negligence claim. The fact that Christian had failed to act—rather
than acted carelessly—was not dispositive. Of course, the plaintiff still
had to prove that the defendant’s behavior fell below an acceptable
standard of care, causing the plaintiff’s injury.105 But Rowland could go
to trial for a jury to decide these issues.
The case opened the duty to warn to a more flexible analysis and
blurred the sharp distinction between action and inaction. Judges
became empowered to impose affirmative duties to warn in a broad
swathe of cases. Indeed, Rowland provided the framework and justi98.

See Robert S. Driscoll, The Law of Premises Liability in America: Its
Past, Present, and Some Considerations for Its Future, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 881, 881 (2006).

99.

Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 562 (Cal. 1968)(later codified at CA
Civ Code §847 (2016)).

100. Id.
101. Id. at 556.
102. Id. at 568.
103. Id. at 564.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 568.
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fication for Tarasoff, where California notoriously imposed on psychotherapists a duty to warn identifiable non-patients of serious risk of
harm.106 While Tarasoff did not require an imminent threat—indeed
the defendant did not murder Tarasoff until ten weeks after discussing
his threats with his psychotherapist—eighteen states and the District
of Columbia now require that to establish a duty to protect thirdparties a threat must be either “imminent” or “immediate.”107
What began with understated language from Rowland blossomed
into an entirely new paradigm, where the law may impose liability for
failing to act on many classes of tortfeasors. The default rule in California, and now elsewhere, is that the defendant owes all reasonably
foreseeable plaintiffs a duty of reasonable care.108 The Rowland court
provided “a number of considerations” that courts should weigh when
deciding whether to depart from the general presumption of a duty.109
These factors have been cited by several hundreds of courts in many
states.110 The considerations are:
(1) the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, (2) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, (3) the closeness of the
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury
suffered, the (4) moral blame attached to the defendant’s conduct,
the (5) policy of preventing future harm, the (6) extent of the
burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach,
and (7) the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the
risk involved.111

106. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 340-343 (Cal.
1976) (“We shall explain that defendant therapists cannot escape liability
merely because Tatiana herself was not their patient. When a therapist
determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine,
that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs
an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against
such danger. The discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take
one or more of various steps, depending upon the nature of the case.”).
107. Mark A. Rothstein, Tarasoff Duties After Newtown, 42 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 104, 107 (2014).
108. See Calvillo-Silva v. Home Grocery, 968 P.2d 65, 71 (Cal. 1998).
109. Rowland, 433 P.2d at 564.
110. The current citation references in Westlaw lists the relevant headnote keycite
being cited a whopping 616 times by other courts. Rowland v. Christian,
Cases, WESTLAW, http://westlaw.com (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
111. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564.
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VI. Applying the Rowland Factors to the Problem at
Hand
While the Rowland court did not tell future judges how to weigh
these various factors, it has become clear that—as with traditional duty
analysis—foreseeability and the magnitude of the harm receive the most
weight. But the actual weight accorded to each factor depends on the
case’s circumstances.112 Because of their instrumental role in developing
the duty to warn, including in the context of duties owed to third
parties, this article applies the Rowland factors to the potential for the
laboratory’s liability for failure to warn of SFs.
a.

The First Factor: The Foreseeability of Harm

In the positive law of all but three states, the primary touchstone
of any duty analysis is whether the harm to the plaintiff is foreseeable.113
When a judge asks whether the harm is foreseeable, she does not ask
whether in fact this defendant predicted the likely occurrence of an
event. Rather, she asks whether the defendant should have realized that
her conduct put someone else at likely risk of harm.114 In most cases
this means that the harm must be likely, but not necessarily certain or
even “more likely than not.”115 Thus, defendants must foresee only
reasonably likely harms, rather than every possibility of harm.116 In the
112. O’Hara v. Holy Cross Hosp., 561 N.E.2d 18, 21 (Ill. 1990).
113. See Formet v. Lloyd Termite Control Co., 110 Cal. Rptr. 3d 551, 557
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (“The foreseeability of the harm, though not
determinative, has become the chief factor in duty analysis.”): see also
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Foreseeability in Breach, Duty, and Proximate
Cause, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1247, 1257-1258 (2009)(The Reporters
of the recent Restatement of Torts reject the reliance on foreseeability in
the analysis of duty, but in so doing, they “risk damaging the credibility
of the Restatement (Third) as a ‘restatement’ by declining to put
foreseeability in the black letter” . . . as “foreseeability is overwhelmingly
embraced by American courts as a vitally important part of duty
analysis.” To varying degrees, Washington, New York, and Arizona courts
have expressed some disfavor with relying too much on foreseeability in
analysis of duty.).
114. ROBERT H. DIERKER AND RICHARD J. MEHAN, 34 MO. PRAC., PERSONAL
INJURY AND TORTS HANDBOOK, §2:6 (2016 ed.) (“Foreseeability is
established when “the evidence indicates that the defendant had actual or
constructive knowledge that there was some probability of a sufficiently
serious injury that an ordinary person would take precautions to avoid
it.”).
115. See Chapman v. Mayfield, 361 P.3d 566, 572 (Or. 2015)(“It is not
necessary that the risk of harm be more probable than not; rather, the
question is whether a reasonable person considering the potential harms
that might result from his or her conduct would “have reasonably
expected the injury to occur.”).
116.

BARRY A. LINDAHI, Existence of duty
LITIGATION § 3:17 (2d ed. 2017).
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context of a laboratory’s affirmative duty to warn, a judge would need
to find that the defendant should reasonably have recognized that her
failure to disclose SFs would likely cause someone harm.117
The most obvious harm would be that the patient’s delayed diagnosis caused her to incur greater medical expenses or suffer a worse
prognosis. This could arise from a physician’s failing to treat something
that could have been treated or prescribing the wrong medicine given
the likelihood of a serious drug reaction. Of course, when it comes to
causation the plaintiff must prove that the physician would have done
something differently because of the SF. But this is also a component
of the foreseeability analysis. Unless the performance of the duty would
have prevented the injury, it makes no sense to impose it.
The laboratory must have actual or constructive knowledge that
there is a reasonably possible causal link between the genotype and
developing a clinically-actionable disease. It is this probable link that
makes the risk of harm foreseeable. Without knowledge that the genetic
mutation is likely pathogenic, there is nothing clinically actionable.
Thus, no potential harm flows from a failure to disclose it. One version
of harm contemplates not that the patient would be put on notice to
pursue contemporaneous treatments, but that she might need to be
extra vigilant for warning signs that she was developing the disease, so
that she could catch it and treat it early. But even in the “need for
medical monitoring” case, the harm is a missed opportunity for a potentially successful clinical intervention. If a physician cannot do anything
to mitigate the genetic risk, there is no duty for the physician to “warn”
of the latent genetic risk.
We cannot say, in the abstract, whether the risk of harm from nondisclosure of SFs is foreseeable.118 Foreseeability hinges on such things
as the type of information the laboratory conveyed, to whom it conveyed the information, and the seriousness and specificity of the
warning. Specifically, the notion of genetic penetrance plays a huge role
in these types of cases because it makes the foreseeability analysis more
complex and less clear-cut than it is in other duty to warn cases.

117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY & PHYSICAL HARM § 41 cmt.
c (Am. Law. Inst. 2010) (“When no reasonable jury could find that there
was a foreseeable risk of harm or a failure to exercise reasonable care,
courts find no liability as a matter of law.”). No one is expected to “warn”
people of things that pose no risk; indeed, this is the very nature of a
warning in that it communicates some impending danger or threat.
118. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, FOR
RESEARCHERS: INCIDENTAL AND SECONDARY FINDINGS (2016), available at:
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcsbi/sites/default/files/Resear
cher%20Primer%20Incidental%20Findings%2010.30.16.pdf.
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i.

What is Penetrance and How Does it Impact the Foreseeability
Analysis?

Penetrance—an important factor in the foreseeability analysis—
played a role in the ACMG report. If penetrance is low, then many
people with a genetic mutation will never develop the phenotype, even
if they have one of the associated markers.119 For example, many people
with mutations in the BRCA1 or BRCA2 genes—those associated with
lung and ovarian cancer—will develop cancer during their lifetime, but
almost as many people will not.120 Currently, geneticists cannot predict
which people with these mutations will develop cancer or when the
tumors will develop, though a family history certainly increases risk.121
Due to the influence of hard-to-measure environmental factors and the
low base rates of some diseases in the population, geneticists will
probably never forecast, with high predictive values, who will develop
many complex cancers such as breast or ovarian cancer.122
A study of symptomatic individuals found the following mean
cumulative cancer risks for mutation carriers at age seventy: “a breast
cancer risk of 55 percent for BRCA1 and 47 percent for BRCA2
mutation carriers; and an ovarian cancer risk of 39 percent for BRCA1
and 17 percent for BRCA2 mutation carriers.”123 While a breast cancer
risk of 57 percent certainly seems sufficient to constitute “foreseeable,”
this is not an accurate predictor in the context of SFs because studies
have not tracked many people with the genotype who do not also have
the phenotype. Current estimates represent the average risk for people
who already have symptoms of cancer, and usually a family history of
cancer.124 For the individuals tested for some other reason—and not
specifically tested for BRCA1 or BRCA2—their risk of developing the
disease will be lower.125 These patients are not likely to be symptomatic
and probably do not have a family history of breast or ovarian cancer
that served as the basis for having the genetic test.126
119. See Green et al., supra note 24, at 568.
120. BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, NAT’L CANCER
INST. (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-preve
ntion/genetics/brca-fact-sheet.
121. Id.
122. C. Marzuillo et al., Predictive Genetic Testing for Complex Diseases: A
Public Health Perspective, 107 Q. J. MED. 93, 94 (2014).
123. Sining Chen & Giovanni Parmigianni, Meta-Analysis of BRCA1 and BRCA2
Penetrance, 11 25 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 1329, 1333 (2007).
124. Id. at 1330.
125. See BRCAI and BRCA2, supra note 120.
126. D Gareth Evans et al., Long-term prospective clinical follow-up after
BRCA1/2 presymptomatic testing: BRCA2 risks higher than in adjusted
retrospective studies 51 J. MED. GENETICS 573, 573 (2014) (“Breast cancer
risks in large familial breast cancer kindreds with BRCA1/BRCA2
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Further, the penetrance and risk factors for everyone are always
changing, as global environmental changes such as pollution and
chemical exposure can lead to “birth cohort effects”, where older women
—a group of people born before 1940—have lower penetrance risk than
women born after 1940, or in a later “birth cohort”.127 The birth-cohort
effect demonstrates that for some diseases, penetrance risks change at
the population level, which probably relates to increased or decreased
environmental risks, although these changes are undetectable for generations.128 As penetrance decreases, the foreseeability of harm from a positive SF decreases.
Similar to disease-prediction, the penetrance and expression of
pharmacogenomics can be complex, making the foreseeability of harm
to any individual difficult to assess.129 Pharmacogenomics studies how
genetic mutations can predict drug metabolism and adverse drug
reactions.130 While genetic factors contribute to adverse drug reactions,
the extent of the genetic contribution varies depending on the person
and the disease process.131 This makes it “difficult to estimate in quantitative terms the contribution of genetic factors relative to other nongenetic factors in predisposing to specific [adverse drug reactions].”132
While it is becoming easier to predict adverse drug reactions caused by
a small number of genetic mutations, predicting complex traits,
involving multiple mutations with small effects, is “almost impossible
in the foreseeable future.”133 Only if the penetrance and expression will
lead to significant harm should the lab have any duty to warn the

mutations are substantially higher than risks derived from populationbased [asymptomatic or presymptomatic] studies.”).
127. Mary Claire King et al, Breast and Ovarian Cancer Risks Due to Inherited
Mutations in BRCA1 and BRCA2, 302 SCIENCE 643, Figure 1 (2003)
(“Age by age, breast cancer risks for mutation carriers born after 1940
were significantly higher than risks for mutation carriers in the same
families born before 1940.”).
128. Id.
129. Alfirevic, supra note 4, at 100 (“However, it has been estimated that
approximately 20–30% of ADRs could be prevented by pharmacogenetic
testing.”).
130. Urs A. Meyer, Pharmacogenetics and Adverse Drug Reactions, 356
LANCET 1667, 1667 (2000).
131. Id.
132. Alfirevic, supra note 4, at 100. Ana Alfirevic and Munir Pirmohamed,
Genomics of Adverse Drug Reactions, 38 TRENDS IN PHARMACOLOGICAL
SCIENCES 100 (2017)
133. Ge Zhang and Daniel Nebert, Personalized medicine: Genetic risk
prediction of drug response, 175 PHARMACOLOGY & THERAPEUTICS 75
(2017) [hereinafter Zhang].
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patient, through her provider, of this SF.134 But if the likelihood of ever
needing a particular drug is incredibly low, there may be no duty to warn.
The best example of this is the use of human leukocyte antigen
(HLA-B) testing to prevent abacavir hypersensitivity, a severe adverse
reaction to an HIV drug, which can cause death.135 The utility of HLAB testing has been demonstrated in controlled trials and its predictive
value and cost-effectiveness has been assessed in different ethnic groups
and healthcare settings.136 And yet, it might still not overcome the
hurdles of foreseeability and imminence because, it is quite unlikely that
an individual would develop HIV and require abacavir.137 In this type
of scenario, it is more appropriate to put this duty-to-warn on the
infectious-disease doctor who prescribed abacavir. Presumably, the
doctor is better positioned to know the adverse-drug reactions for the
drugs they routinely prescribe. The doctor should test all patients the
HLA-B marker before administering abacavir.138 As the list of SFs continues to grow, patients cannot be expected to retain this information
for future, potential, clinical use.139
As with other genetic SFs, there will be many false positives due to
the rarity of these adverse-drug events and incomplete penetrance and
environmental risk factors.140 But the risk of false positives for adverse
drug reactions is less catastrophic than with disease-causing SFs,
because the issue is not about a patient receiving stressful news that
she might develop cancer or Alzheimer’s disease. Instead, the issue is
about warning her that should she ever need a particular drug, if there
is an available and reasonable substitute, she should take it instead.
This presents a very different cost-benefit analysis and makes it less
likely someone would choose not to receive a warning.

134. Id.
135. Alfirevic, supra note 4, at 102.
136. Id.
137. HIV in the United States: At A Glance, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/h
iv/statistics/overview/ataglance.html (last updated Nov. 29, 2017).
138. LAURA DEAN, Abacavir Therapy and HLA-B*57:01 Genotype, in MEDICAL
GENETICS SUMMARIES 7 (2015).
139. The increasing use of electronic, interoperable medical records provides
an exciting technological fix to this problem, where SFs can be stored in
a medical record and physicians can be notified of them when and if the
SF becomes clinically relevant. See Nicole Weiskopf & Chunhua Weng,
Methods and Dimensions of Electronic Health Record Data Quality
Assessment: Enabling Reuse for Clinical Research, 20 JAMA 144, 144
(2013).
140. Zhang, supra note 133.
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ii.

What is Expression and How Does it Impact the Foreseeability
Analysis?

Another important factor in the foreseeability analysis is variable
expressivity, which captures the idea that a disorder’s severity can
change from one person to the next, even though they possess the same
disease-causing genetic mutation.141 For example, some people with
Marfan’s disease are taller than average with long fingers, while others
may also experience life-threatening heart and circulatory symptoms.142
Variable expressivity affects the analysis of duty because a disease that
presents in varying intensity (could be negligible, could be debilitating)
reduces the certainty of significant harm. This, in turn, makes the
average risk less foreseeable and reduces the pressure to impose a duty
to warn. The genetics of many disorders are complex and there is still
quite a bit unknown about whether a mutation will lead to severe
disease.143 Environmental factors can increase or decrease penetrance
and expression, as can the presence of other genetic mutations that
amplify or soften the effect of a deleterious mutation.144 Defendants
generally do not have duties to warn of minimal or trivial risks.145 If
judges take seriously the complexity of genetic causes of disease, judges
should be reluctant to extend a duty for labs to warn of SFs with the
potential for minimal and benign expression.
iii.

What is Analytic Validity and How will it Impact the Foreseeability
Analysis?

In addition to expecting false positives due to incomplete
penetrance, there will also be many false negatives, particularly when
the laboratory analyzes the sample using WES. Researchers have
warned that clinical-exome sequencing to interpret and report particular genes “requires recognition of the substantial possibility of inadequate depth and breadth of sequencing coverage at clinically relevant
locations,” which will contribute to false-negatives. 146 This is a problem
because the ACMG report recommended that every clinical-exome test
141. Cooper et al., supra note 43, at 1078.
142. Id. at 1077.
143. Id. at 1079. See also What Do We Mean by ‘Duty to Warn?’, AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/newsroom/apa-blogs/apa-blog/2018/01/what-do-we-mean-by-duty-to-warn
[hereinafter Duty to Warn].
144. Id. at 1079.
145. What Do We Mean by ‘Duty to Warn’, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Jan. 16,
2018), https://www.psychiatry.org/news-room/apa-blogs/apa-blog/201
8/01/what-do-we-mean-by-duty-to-warn [hereinafter Am. Psychiatric
Ass’n].
146. Jason Park et al., Clinical Exome Performance for Reporting Secondary
Genetic Findings, 61 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 213, 220 (2015).
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report on fifty-nine genes, even though the analytical validity of exome
sequencing for these mutations may be of insufficient quality.147 Poor
quality occurs because the test would not validate the exome screen for
locating SF mutations. This means that the developers of the exome
sequencing screens recognize that there is a lot of noise and clutter in
the haystack that is searched.148 Significant things can be missed and
insignificant things can be found. In order to confirm to confirm or
diagnose the presence of a mutation, one would not use exome sequencing to do it.149 After an initial positive finding on exome sequencing,
the physician would follow up with a targeted test that is validated at
finding a particular needle in the vast haystack.150 There are a few
technical reasons why the exome sequencing is not good at diagnostics.
First, the exome sequencing does not cover everything. Estimates of the
coding sequence not covered by exome sequencing range from 1.4 to
39.1 percent.151 Coverage will vary based on the quality parameters of
the test and its minimum depth coverage, the source of the DNA,
whether blood or saliva, the density of GC nucleotides, how the sequence is chemically enriched before being analyzed, and the method of
sequencing. 152 These variables will impact how sure we can be that a
positive or negative finding through WES means anything.
The ACMG working group anticipated the need for validation when
it acknowledged that Sanger sequencing or other approaches would
need to “fill in” with slower and more thorough tests, if the gene were
being evaluated for a primary diagnosis.153 The working group also
reiterated that it did not recommend disclosing SFs where the primary
genetic cause is a structural variant, repeat, or copy-number variant—
because exome sequencing is not a reliable technology for measuring
these—and the ACMG did not want to recommend “that laboratories
utilize orthogonal techniques to search for these variants.”154 While the
disclaimer is necessary, it reveals the false assurance that can stem from
whole exome sequencing. Namely, a patient might incorrectly assume
that negative findings means no genetic defects, when in reality they
might have a series of complex mutations that ACMG just does not
147. Id. at 213.
148. Clinical Whole Exome Sequencing Informed Consent, N.Y. GENOME CTR.,
http://www.nygenome.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/NYGCClinical-Whole-Exome-Sequencing.pdf (last updated Jan. 27, 2106).
149. Whole Exome Sequencing, BAYLOR MIRACA, 5, https://www.bc
m.edu/research/medical-genetics-labs/?pmid=22653 (last visited Apr. 4,
2018).
150. Id. at 2.
151. Park, supra note 146, at 220.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Green, supra note 32, at 567.
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suggest reporting. If it becomes common clinical practice to return SFs,
patients might expect that a negative means they are “free and clear”
of genetic risk, when in fact that is not the case.155
The lack of consensus on reporting false negatives, plus the variability in rates of false negatives illustrates that the foreseeability
analysis is not straightforward.156 Laboratories are not casting out perfect searches of the haystack, and if they find a needle, they cannot be
sure this is a real, actual needle. Some of the “needles” found in the SF
haystack are fake, due to the cheaper, less thorough, exome sequencing.
And the searches miss lots of needles, too. To run targeted, validated
genetic tests for each of the fifty-nine ACMG mutations, and any
additional mutations that predict serious drug reactions, would require
too much financial and time resources of laboratories. The lack of robust
analytical validity in the WES context substantially reduces the
foreseeability of future harm.
iv.

Summary of the Foreseeability Factor Analysis

Unlike traditional duty-to-warn cases, the risk presented by SFs is
highly-variable and depends on factors such as genetic penetrance and
expression. Further, the number of false positives and false negatives
likely from WGS and WES makes the risk of harm from non-disclosure
even less likely. This makes it difficult to say that, in the abstract, the
risk of harm for non-disclosure is foreseeable enough to impose an affirmative duty on laboratories to warn patients of SFs. But courts may
not frame the analysis in this way.
Courts should analyze foreseeability in the abstract, and not as
applied to a particular plaintiff. But courts can interpret this “abstract
duty” a little less abstractly. For example, even in the landmark case
of Tarasoff, the duty was not an absolute duty to warn anyone of a
patient’s threats.157 It was limited factually to only warning of serious
threats to identifiable people. For example, one cannot say that the risk
of non-disclosure of all SFs is reasonably likely to cause harm.158 If you
narrow the inquiry to SFs that are disease-causing, highly-penetrant,
have low variance in expression, and high-analytic validity, then the
foreseeability of harm is greater. But narrowing the question in this way
is a much more fact-intensive inquiry, and therefore courts should
instead focus on the breach-element of breach, rather than the negligence analysis.

155. Id.
156. Park, supra note 146, at220.
157. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d
334, 340 (1976)
158. Negligence, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/n
egligence (last visited Feb. 24, 2018) and Duty to Warn, supra note 143.
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But judges might, in some circumstances, find this sort of remote
harm foreseeable. Judges are human and are vulnerable to subconsciously reframing arguments in favor of an award of damages where
someone could have prevented a lost chance of a better outcome. It is
very difficult to draw a sharp line between a preferred abstract inquiry
and a fact-specific one. Even the most uncontested duty analyses involve fact-finding under the foreseeability prong. But just because a
harm is conceivable to a particular person does not mean it should be
foreseeable to a large group of potential defendants ex ante.
Even if a judge included fact-specific inquiries—such as penetrance,
expression, and analytic validity of a positive result for a genetic mutation—into her analysis of foreseeability, finding that the risk of harm
was foreseeable does not end the debate. Foreseeability is the first
factor, as “[m]any harms are quite literally foreseeable, yet for pragmatic reasons, no recovery is allowed . . . [a] . . . further inquiry must
be made . . . .”159 Let us proceed with this further inquiry, and turn to
the next Rowland factor.
b.

The Second Factor: The Plaintiff Must Have Suffered A Certain,
Concrete Harm

The second Rowland factor considers the degree of certainty that
the plaintiff suffered harm. It imposes a check on liability for intangible—or purely emotional—harms. Courts are reluctant to impose an
affirmative duty to warn where the harm is not capable of easy measurement or proof.160 Thus, the type of injury alleged matters a great deal.
In traditional negligence claims, plaintiffs can allege emotional,
physical, property, or purely-financial damages. But the parties rarely
litigate the degree of certainty of harm in duty-to-warn cases, because
the harm that materialized is obvious, such as the murder of Tatiana
or Rowland’s severed hand tendons.161 Where a plaintiff alleges either
nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm,
however, courts will often declare a non-suit because the defendant had
no duty to warn of these kinds of futuristic or intangible harms.162
159. Munn v. Hotchkiss School, 795 F.3d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 2015).
160. Kesner v. Superior Court, 384 P.3d 283, 293 (Cal. 2016) (“The second
Rowland factor, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury,
‘has been noted primarily, if not exclusively, when the only claimed injury
is an intangible harm such as emotional distress.’ Courts have occasionally
included under this factor concerns about the existence of a remedy.”).
161. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 145; see also Emerich, 720 A.2d at
1032.
162. Describing the idea that even where the defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff, there must be a cognizable, realized injury to the plaintiff in
order for recovery in tort. Increasing the risk of harm, or “inchoate” harm,
is not enough. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 1638 (2002).
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Construction defects makes this concept clear. Courts have found
that breaches which “have not ripened into property damage, or at least
into involuntary out-of-pocket losses, do not comfortably fit the
definition of an ‘appreciable harm’—an essential element of a negligence
claim.”163 There is no common law negligence suit if construction defects
have not yet caused a real harm.164 A plaintiff can sue once the pipe
leaks turns from a potential to an actual injury. As courts have been
reluctant to impose a duty in cases where the harm is purely emotional
or financial—without accompanying physical injury to person or
property—courts might be particularly reluctant to do so when
expanding affirmative duties to warn.165
As applied to the genetic-sequencing context, plaintiffs will
probably be required to demonstrate some present, ripe, cognizable
injury from the lab’s failure to disclose an SF. If the plaintiff has died
or incurred significant medical expenses and alleges the defendant’s
breach caused these injuries, this factor will not prevent recovery. But
where the plaintiff is still alive and has alleged that she suffered “lost
chance” of survival due to defendant’s breach or a speculative future
harm, courts are less likely to impose a duty to warn for this kind of
intangible, difficult-to-quantify, harm. Typically, the harms must concretely materialize.
c.

The Third Factor: There Must be A Close Connection Between
Defendant’s Conduct and the Injury Suffered

Causation—an element independent of negligence—also comes into
play as the third Rowland factor. Under the analysis of duty, the “close
connection between defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered” serves
to further narrow the class of obligations for which the defendant had

163. Davies v. Krasna, 535 P.2d 1161, 1172 (Cal. (1975); see San Francisco
Unified School Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal.App.4th 1318, 1327–
1331, [the presence of asbestos products in buildings did not, prior to the
release of friable asbestos, constitute actual and appreciable harm under
Davies v. Krasna].
164. Aas v. Superior Court, 12 P.3d 1125, 1137–38 (Cal. 2000) (superceded by
statute to provide a right to sue, acknowledging that the legislature
needed to impose this duty as it did not exist through common law). The
general premise still remains, however, that “[t]he mere breach of duty—
causing only nominal damages, speculative harm or the threat of future
harm not yet realized—normally does not suffice to create a cause of
action.” San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 37 Cal.
App. 4th 1318, 1326, (1995). For application of the requirement of
“appreciable harm” for tort recovery in different contexts, see
Massachusetts Elec. Co. v. Fletcher, Tilton & Whipple, P.C., 394 Mass.
265, 268, (1985).
165. John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA.
L. REV. 1625, 1659-1602 (2002).
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a duty to warn.166 In our hypothetical case, plaintiffs must prove that
knowledge of SFs would have probably resulted in different clinical
treatments, which would have prevented their legally cognizable
injuries. For example, terminal cancer patients would struggle to establish a wrongful death claim because it would be hard to prove, given
their cancer, that they would probably have lived if they had known
about the SF. Further, not all diseases are treatable or preventable. For
example, if the SF indicated that the patient was at risk for a type of
early-onset dementia, then the patient could not show causation
between a failure to warn and the injury of dementia if the patient
could not have prevented the dementia from developing or if it were
treated in a different way.
If the causation question hinges on the facts of the particular case
—such as in the case of whether Christian Williams would have been
treated differently had the VUS been classified as Dravet-causing167—
then the judge should typically let the jury decide whether this satisfies
the element of causation.168 At least one court has recognized that
incomplete information about penetrance and the potential success of
treatment can foreclose summary judgment.169 In Safer v. Estate of Pack,
New Jersey’s superior court stated:
we are led to understand from the experts’ reports that the risk
of multiple polyposis was significant and that, upon detection, an
early full colectomy, i.e., an excision of her entire colon, may well
have been the treatment of choice to avoid resultant cancerincluding metastasis, the loss of other organs and the rigors of
chemotherapy. Full factual development may, however, cast a
different light on these issues of fact and others.170

Because causation in this particular case could not be proven, the
case went to trial.171
As a class, plaintiffs might argue that a laboratory’s failure to warn
caused them to miss out on a chance of a good clinical prognosis. But
if a plaintiff complains of wrongful death instead of a “lost chance,”
then courts are more likely to find there was no duty to warn. The “lost
chance” theory first emerged in cases where defendants had duties to
rescue someone that stood in a close, special relationship to them.172
166. Watkinson v. MortgageIT, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53540 (S.D. Cal.,
June 1, 2010).
167. Wagner, supra note 57.
168. Id.
169. Safer, 677 A.2d at 1193.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. The Fourth Circuit held that “this view ignores the underlying character
of the duty. It was less than a duty to rescue him, but it was a positive

248

Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018
Needles, Haystacks and Next-Generation Genetic Sequencing

In a minority of states the theory of lost chance operates to relax
the standard of causation, where the plaintiff can receive compensation
even where it is not possible for the plaintiff to prove that she would
have probably survived in absence of the defendant’s breach.173 But this
is thought of as an “extreme” position.174 In most states, the “lost
chance” theory reframes the injury and compensates the degree to
which the chance of survival was lost.175 Courts typically only allow the
“lost chance of survival” claim if the defendant breached a duty to fail
to rescue someone he or she should have or committed medical
malpractice resulting in the plaintiff’s death.176
Because imposing a duty to rescue departs from traditional common
law, it is narrowly circumscribed. Most defendants do not owe a duty
duty to make a sincere attempt at rescue. The duty is of such nature that
its omission will contribute to cause the seaman’s death. The duty arises
when there is a reasonable possibility of rescue. . . . [t]herefore, proximate
cause here is implicit in the breach of duty.” Gardner v. Nat’l Bulk
Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284, 287 (4th Cir. 1962).
173. J. Stephen Phillips, The “Lost Chance” Theory of Recovery, Colo. Law.
85-86 (1998); “In medical malpractice cases involving preexisting medical
conditions, a majority of jurisdictions have declined to relax the standard
of causation or create a new compensable injury.” Lisa Perrochet, Lost
Chance Recovery and the Folly of Expanding Medical Malpractice
Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 615, 628 (1992).
174. See DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986) (“[This
position] effectively allows a jury to speculate on causation because expert
testimony that a physician’s negligence probably caused the total damages
is not required. This is an extreme position and clearly distorts the
traditional principles of causation.”); see also Alice Férot, The Theory of
Loss of Chance: Between Reticence and Acceptance, 8 F. INT’L U. L REV.
591, 593-94 (2013) (“Professor King, however, formulated the theory of
loss in chance in terms of causation and burden of proof, not in terms of
injury . . . . The loss of chance is not a theory of causation but a theory
of injury.”).
175. Watson v. Glenwood Reg’l Med. Ctr., 163 So. 3d 817, 822 (La. Ct. App.
2015) (“The loss of chance of survival is a distinct compensable injury
caused by a defendant’s negligence, distinguishable from the loss of life in
wrongful death cases . . . In short, the lost chance is a separate and
valuable claim or element of damages, not a distinct cause of action that
may accrue later than the initial act of malpractice.”).
176. Pelas v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 1999 WL 438478, at *2 (E.D. La. June 28,
1999)(“In limiting recovery to medical malpractice cases, the Hardy court
emphasized the need to restrict the application of the relaxed burden to
special circumstances such as the patient-physician relationship.” Id. at
*9 quoting Hardy v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 910 P.2d 1024, 1029
(Okla. 1996)); See also, Férot, supra note 174, at 592 (“In the United
States, the theory of loss of chance has been implemented mostly in the
area of medical malpractice. Usually, a patient, or his or her
representative, will sue a healthcare provider for a failure to diagnose or
a failure to cure a medical condition that resulted in the diminution of
the patient’s chance to survive or recover from the condition.”).
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to rescue or warn plaintiffs in the absence of a pre-existing, special
relationship with the plaintiff.177 Again, it is the physical custody,
fiduciary obligation, and vulnerability of the plaintiff vis-à-vis the
defendant that imposes a duty to rescue upon the defendant.178 For
example, a ship master should at least attempt to rescue one of his
seaman because no one else could rescue him and he was put at risk by
the ship master’s enterprise.179 Once again, this duty is limited to
rescuing from imminent physical injury, and courts do not automatically analogize from a duty to rescue to a duty to warn.180 While a
duty to rescue is far more burdensome than a duty to warn, the risk of
imminent physical injury motivates each duty.
Courts are disinclined to impose affirmative duties to rescue or
warn if the plaintiff cannot prove that the defendant’s inaction probably
caused the plaintiff’s injury and the plaintiff did not share a special
relationship with the defendant.181 Courts adhere rigidly to the typical
burden of proof with each element because not every injury requires
compensation from tort law. Some injuries are too intangible and
distant from defendant’s actions to impose tort liability. Simply that
an injury may be prevented does not mean the defendant owes a duty
to prevent it.182 The plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s failure to
warn was a probable—not just a possible—cause of plaintiff’s injury.183
The plaintiff would have a much stronger claim against the
laboratory if the plaintiff suffered a concrete, materialized physical
injury and can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
laboratory caused her injury by failing to warn her of the SF. To the
extent a plaintiff alleges “lost chance” of a better outcome and cannot
prove that her injury would have been averted if the lab had given her
the SF, the plaintiff would lose in most states. In our case the patient
is likely already exhibiting symptoms of another disease that is warranting the genetic test. Proving that delayed diagnosis of an SF caused a
significant lost chance is difficult, though not impossible. A plaintiff
could easier prove causation if the SF is linked to a more serious disease
than the disease for which the patient initially sought treatment. Some
states limit the “lost chance” theory of injury to traditional medical
malpractice where the defendant-physician breached a standard of care

177. Groninger, supra note 61, at 359.
178. See id. at 358.
179. See id. at 360.
180. Id. at 360.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 356.
183. See Owen, supra note 60, at 1671.
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by failing to make an important diagnosis.184 Thus, if the plaintiff is
suing in one of those states, the injury could not be framed as lost
chance of a better outcome.
d.

The Fourth Factor: The Moral Blame Attached to Defendant’s
Conduct

The moral blame attached to a laboratory for failing to return SFs
or VUS is not as intense as the blame attached to someone who fails to
warn of imminent, physical injury. Moral blame is particularly fascinating as applied to tort law. The history of tort law is checkered
when it comes to liability being connected to moral blame.185 The law
can hold employers liable for the actions of their employees, even when
they are not at fault in supervising them.186 Similarly, the law might
hold those with mental illness liable, even where it is impossible for
them to conform their conduct to the standard tort law requires.187
Indeed, much of tort law has very little to do with moral wrongfulness.
But when it comes to expanding liability for the unexpected, courts
return to the moral blameworthiness of the inaction as a touchstone to
determine whether a duty to warn exists.188
It is not easy to assess blame in the abstract, because we tend to
impose blame somewhat irrationally and based largely upon outcome.
For example, in the abstract people probably do not expect a laboratory
to return SFs or VUS, and so long as no one is injured, people will not
find that the laboratory was blameworthy for failing to return these
results. But if someone suffers injury, even if the injury was not
foreseeable, people tend to attribute blame and intentionality to the
same previously blame-free decision. If the defendant is sued and could
have prevented the delayed diagnosis, people will attribute some culpability to its decision not to warn. Even if the actor did not anticipate
the bad outcome, outcome matters a great deal.189 This effect seems to
184. Misdiagnosis and Failure to Diagnose, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/i
njury/medical-malpractice/misdiagnosis-and-failure-to-diagnose/
(last
visited March 13, 2018).
185. See generally Christopher Jackson, Tort, Moral Luck, and Blame, 60
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 57, 58 (2012).
186. Russel G. Thornton, Responsibility for the Act of Others, 23 BAYLOR
UNIV. MED. CTR. PROC. 313, 313 (2010).
187. William J. Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally
Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L. J. 52, 52 (1960).
188. Thomas J. Murphy, Affirmative Duties in Tort Following Tarasoff, 58 St.
John’s L. Rev. 492, 527 (2012).
189. Mark D. Alicke, Blaming Badly, 8 J. COGNITION AND CULTURE 179, 181
fn. 1 (2008) (“Intentionality judgments are, therefore, susceptible to
outcome bias, which involves judging an outcome in terms of its
consequences, independent of the decision-maker’s intentions and the
causal process by which they were generated.”).
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work only in one direction; humans blame those who accidentally cause
harm and attribute intentionality to their actions, but do not praise
those who accidentally cause a benefit. This is the “praise/blame
asymmetry” or the “Knobe effect.”190 And it has an impact on tort law.
As tort scholars Goldberg and Zipursky note, there is a certain
amount of luck that factors into liability: the careless actor who
happens not to injure someone pays nothing, but the careless actor who
unluckily injures someone pays a great deal.191 The law of negligence
disproportionately punishes those who happen to get unlucky when
they are careless and juries may infer bad intent or blameworthiness to
their actions even when there was none. This common practice, and its
underlying moral philosophy, suggests that jurors will find the laboratory morally blameworthy if they knew an SF was pathogenic and
treatment was available and it failed to warn the patient, even if
penetrance was low and expression was variable. Or, the laboratory
could be considered morally blameworthy if it knew the SF related to
a severe drug reaction and did not pass that information along to the
patient because the laboratory believed it quite unlikely that the
patient would ever need the drug. If the patient ever needed the drug,
the laboratory may have believed that a physician would order the
relevant genetic test. Another scenario would involve a case like the
Williams’, where a laboratory designated a mutation of “unknown
significance,” and the pathogenicity of the mutation was ambiguous.192
If in hindsight the mutation proved to be pathogenic, a jury might infer
moral blameworthiness to the lab who legitimately designated the mutation as VUS. But placing blame on the defendant probably only
occurs when the plaintiff suffers significantly from the non-disclosure.
Because assessing duty and blame should be decided more abstractly and should apply to many cases with different facts, it seems unlikely
that the laboratory should be thought of as morally blameworthy for
failing to warn patients of unforeseeable harms. The plaintiff can make
a stronger case for moral blameworthiness if the laboratory does not
share the SFs with the ordering physician it knows to be pathogenic
and treatable. Even that failure, however, is less blameworthy than the
failure to warn readily identifiable victims of imminent physical
violence. If any moral blame exists, it is a small dose aimed at the
physician who failed to share the results with his or her patient. It is
aimed less at the lab who failed to share results directly with the

190. The praise/blame asymmetry is widespread; it holds for 4 year olds, Hindispeakers, and people with emotional deficits. See, Frank Hindriks,
Normativity in Action: How to Explain the Knobe Effect and its Relatives,
29 MIND AND LANGUAGE, 51, 53 (2014).
191. Goldberg and Zipursky, supra note 165, at1132, 1135.
192. See Williams v. Quest Diagnostics, 2014 Okla. Dist. LEXIS 394 (7th Dist.
Oct. 24, 2014).
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patients. Imposing moral outrage or blame on the lab’s failure to
disclose SFs likely results from the Knobe effect.193
Empirical data can provide a sense of our intuition about the
laboratory’s obligations and likely correlates to how blame would attach
for failure to meet these obligations. When surveyed, sixty-seven
percent of genetics professionals believed that health-care providers
have an obligation to return positive SFs from clinical-exome
sequencing or whole-genome sequencing for Mendelian diseases.194 Sixtyone percent thought they should disclose SFs of negative-drug
interactions, 49 percent thought they should disclose carrier status, 20
percent thought they should disclose complex traits, and 25 percent
thought they should not disclose any SFs.195 This population is biased
because they are sophisticated genetics professionals as opposed to lay
patients or plaintiffs who would receive the information.196 Nevertheless,
focus-group studies indicate that most non-African-American participants would want “actionable” genetic-WGS results yielding benefits
such as medical treatment or disease prevention, and “expect and are
motivated by the ability to use individual genetic information for future
planning.”197 While some participants self-identified as “planners” who
want more information for the sake of family-reproductive planning,
this was not a universal response.198 Some participants did not want to
know results with likely false-positives or false-negatives because it
would “cloud” their thinking, might be “too big, too scary” and such
results might be “paralyzing.”199 These lay-people perspectives render
non-disclosure much more morally ambiguous, at least in the abstract
and ex ante.
The nature of the conveyed information renders non-disclosure
much less morally blameworthy than in the cases where courts have
imposed a duty to warn. Namely, a therapist who fails to inform a
potential victim that one of his patients intends to harm him is more
morally blameworthy, as is a homeowner who fails to warn a guest of a
sharp piece of broken porcelain. These cases are unambiguous in terms
of their moral valence, given the magnitude of the risk of non-disclosure
193. Joshua Knobe, Intentional Action and Side Effects in Ordinary Language,
63 ANALYSIS 190, 194 (2003).
194. Yu 2014, supra note 31 at 79.
195. Id. at 84.
196. Id. at 77.
197. Joon-Ho Yu, et al., “Attitudes of Non-African American Focus Group
Participants Toward Return of Results from Exome and Whole Genome
Sequencing, 95 AM J. HUMAN GENETICS 2153, 2157 (2014) [hereinafter Yu].
198. Id. at 5-6.
199. Yu, supra note 197, at 2156.
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as compared with the risk of unnecessarily worrying the victim. With
the return of SFs, the risk is more equivocal because there is a possibility of future harm from non-disclosure, but also a possibility of
harm from disclosure, and the risk is much less imminent. Because the
would-be patients disagree about whether they ought to have this
information communicated to them, the tort “duty to warn” stands on
a shaky moral ground.
e.

The Fifth Factor: The Policy of Preventing Future Harm

The policy of preventing future harm is the next Rowland factor.
While not every preventable harm imposes a tort obligation to do so,
this factor weighs into the calculation. It also relates to the other factors
of foreseeability, moral blame, and causation. But rather than looking
at particular cases and arguing whether a warning could prevent harm
in a specific instance, the “policy of prevention” factor considers the
abstract social perspective and looks at net harms prevented. The question becomes whether the policy of imposing a duty to warn in general
and on average—prevents future harms.200
When it comes to disease-causing SFs, there is a good, but weaker
claim for disclosure on prevention grounds. It might be difficult to prove
that a patient would have pursued a different treatment had she had
known about her SF or that the non-disclosure caused her injury. But
in the aggregate, knowledge of SFs would lead to better clinical
outcomes if the patient can recall the SF when necessary. Despite the
significant risks of false positives and false negatives—and the
possibility of psychological stress or false assurances—the more concrete
harm is the injury from a delayed diagnosis, such as medical expenses
and a premature death, that could be averted. And it is this injury
which could be prevented by requiring labs to disclose clinically actionable SFs.
Again prevention of future harm depends on the type of duty
alleged. In terms of prevention, the case for disclosing adverse-drug
genotypes is perhaps the strongest, given that the patient might be
offered a drug, she could refuse, given with knowledge of her a SF. It
might not be foreseeable that she would ever need the particular drug,
but there is a strong argument that had she been told of this particular
SF, she could have avoided a serious reaction if she ever needed the
drug in the future. But this assumes that the patient would remember
the SF and recall it when offered that drug in the future. It assumes
that her physician would have entered the SF into her medical record
for future use. Both of these situations are plausible, if not certain.
Many of serious adverse drug events could be prevented if patients were
warned of their SFs.
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While the ACMG does not recommend returning pharmacogenomics SFs,201 laboratories may have a greater tort duty to warn of
potentially fatal drug side effects that could be predicted by someone’s
genetics because of the improved ability to prevent a concrete harm.
Even though the foreseeability of harm varies based on penetrance and
the complexity of genetics, some single, rare mutations predict severe
drug reactions, as discussed above with the use of abacavir in patients
with particular HLA-B mutations.202 When a laboratory knows of these
mutations, and the individual takes the proscribed drug, the foreseeability of harm is likely and could lead to death.203
This still assumes that laboratories would share the information in
a way that makes sense to the patient, that the patient remembered it,
and could recall it when necessary. Even so, because these plaintiffs
could demonstrate that they would have remembered their SF and
would have done something different regarding their health, they can
show that disclosure would prevent future harm. The disclosure of
information could be used in many clinical ways that are quite thoughtful and deliberate, including future generation’s reproductive planing.204 It is therefore possible to say that knowledge of the SF could
prevent aggregate future harms from delayed diagnosis or drug interactions. Indeed, this factor might favor return of SFs than it was in
Rowland and Tarasoff.
Empirical data published following the Tarasoff case demonstrated
that this factor could have made the court move in a different direction.205 Therapists are not particularly good at predicting when
violence is imminent, and given the nature of the risk—serious physical
violence, which could occur at any time—a warning does not usually
prevent the harm.206 Even if Tatiana Tarasoff had been warned of her
murderer’s plot, short of staying home on house arrest for her life, the
warning could not have kept her murderer away. This strikes a huge
blow to imposing a duty and calls into question the plaintiff’s ability to
prove causation. If a warning will not prevent harm, then imposing a
201. Orli G. Bahcall, ACMG Guides on the Interpretation of Sequence
Variants, 16 NATURE REV. GENETICS 256, 256 (2015).
202. Sources cited supra notes 138-141 (discussing HIV and HLBA).
203. Zhang, supra note 132, at 76.
204. If the claim is “lost chance to terminate a pregnancy” courts are much
less willing to entertain this claim than if it is framed as a “lost chance to
employ genetic screening devices” to select particular embryos for
implantation. Simmons v. W. Covina Med. Clinic, 260 Cal. Rptr. 722,
776-77, (Ct. App. 1989).
205. Toni Pryor Wise, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STANFORD L. REV. 165,
186-187 (1978); Douglas Mossman, The Imperfection of Protection
Through Detection and Intervention¸ 30 J. LEGAL MED. 109, 133 (2009).
206. Wise, supra note 205, at 187; Mossman, supra note 205, at 133.
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duty may be motivated too much by moral outrage and a desire to hold
someone accountable, rather than on typical negligence grounds.
f.

The Sixth Factor: The Potential Resource Burden on Labs

Many of the Rowland factors mimic the rubric the ACMG working
group used to determine which SFs laboratories should routinely
disclose.207 This is not surprising, because the elements of negligence
mirror cost-benefit assumptions about how we should hold those who
engage in careless behavior accountable. But there is a key difference
between the ACMG criteria for disclosure and the Rowland criteria.
Tort law recognizes that while there might be an ethical obligation to
warn, there might not be a legal one if the burden of warning is too
great.208 Courts should consider whether imposing this duty will cost
the defendants too much time or money, relative to the risk being
prevented.
If the duty to warn is framed in terms of merely having to provide
the ordering physician with clinically actionable, validated pathogenic
SFs that were already analyzed, along with some basic interpretive
information, this is not likely to be too burdensome. Indeed, courts will
likely see this burden as commensurate with any preventable risk, given
that the burden is merely passing along already-gathered results.209 This
is analogous to asking a physician to report an incidental finding of a
liver tumor the physician detected when he or she ordered a stomach
X-ray. To reduce the risk of undue psychological distress on the patient,
the physician must then place the results in context, including for the
patient. This includes communicating with the patient the need for
confirmation testing. In the context of genetic sequencing, it would be
inappropriate for the laboratory to assume a duty to place the results
in context for the patient whom they have never met and likely never
will because the laboratory has no special relationship with the patient.
Thus, if framed in terms of needing to disclose SFs to the ordering
provider, there is a good case for this duty to be imposed, assuming
that the risk of harm is foreseeable and significant.
If, however, the lab is expected to: investigate public or medical
records to find contact information for the patient, contact the patient
and reveal the presence of the SF, follow-up with clinical referrals, pay
for additional sequencing methods to confirm the presence of the SF,
request samples from the patients and then test those samples to
determine the spontaneity or heritability of the mutation, and run
contemporaneous literature-review searches after every test to ensure
current classifications of SFs, then these are too great of burdens to
207. Kalia, supra note 40, at 249.
208. PETER CANE, ATIYAH’S ACCIDENTS, COMPENSATION,
(2013).

AND THE

209. See Davis v. Wyeth Lab., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968).
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impose. Like all of the Rowland factors, this evaluation is a judgment
call. Courts could reach different conclusions, depending on how they
weigh the benefits of prevention and the burdens of disclosure. But if
courts take seriously the balancing of benefits and costs of imposing
this duty and consider early duty-to-warn cases, courts should not
impose any duty on a laboratory to directly contact patients with
clinically ambiguous SFs.
Based on personal conversations with lab directors, it is clear that
some labs voluntarily undertake to do more than what the law requires.
But as more patients submit samples for WES or WGS, the frequency
of these scenarios will be too great for laboratories to incur their cost.
Laboratories test patients and run ad hoc literature reviews on genetic
tests because the volume is not too great.210 But this will not be scaleable, absent future insurance reimbursement for this sort of task.
g.

The Seventh Factor: The Lack of Insurance to Spread the Cost of
Imposing a Duty

The Rowland court included a final factor that assessed the cost,
prevalence and availability of insurance to mitigate the risk.211 If the
defendant could purchase insurance—say, such as renter’s insurance as
Christian did in the Rowland case itself, or liability insurance in
malpractice cases—to absorb some of the cost of resulting injuries,
courts should be more inclined to impose a duty.212 But if a considerable
portion of the injury comes from pain and suffering damages that the
plaintiff cannot cover through insurance or if there is no real way of
limiting the defendant’s exposure, then this factor mitigates against
imposing a duty.213 If the potential for liability is too vast, then the
burden on defendants will be too great to justify. The few courts to
directly address this factor have emphasized that the liability must have
some limits, so that defendants do not become bankrupt and are not
“priced out” of buying insurance in the future.214
If clinical laboratories have a duty to warn patients of SFs, it is
unclear who would pay for this burden and the resulting injuries upon
breach of that duty. Currently, clinical laboratories likely do not have
adequate liability insurance to cover the cost of failure-to-warn
lawsuits. This is a new conception of a legal duty, likely not built into
210. Lidia Feliubadolo et al., Benchmarking of Whole Exome Sequencing and
Ad Hoc Designed Panels for Genetic Testing of Hereditary Cancer, SCI.
REP. (Jan. 4, 2017).
211. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 568.
212. Id. at 567-68.
213. See Kesner v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. App. 4th 251, 261 (Cal. Ct. App.
2014) superceeded by Kesner v. S.C. (Pneumo Abex LLC), 331 P.3d 179
(Cal. 2014) vacated, Kesner v. S. C., 384 P.3d 283 (Cal. 2016).
214. See Kesner v. S. C., 384 P.3d 283, 296 (Cal. 2016).
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existing policies. If courts impose this duty, insurance markets might
begin to provide this coverage, but it will be difficult to price as wholeexome sequencing is only just beginning in the clinical sphere. Liability
exposure could be vast if damages extend beyond SFs likely to cause
foreseeable, severe harm. Of course, a first-of-its-kind high profile case
with a pediatric patient who was killed, due to unreported SFs, and
who might not have been had the lab reported different data, might be
enough to steer this litigation in the wrong direction. While courts have
imposed liability on laboratories for mishandling or improperly
classifying results or omitting key findings, the return of SFs presents
a novel duty that insurance providers have not yet incorporated into
their policies.
This factor typically addresses the availability of insurance to cover
the defendant industry’s liability. But given the role that the plaintiff’s
medical-insurance plays in reducing the financial cost of compliance for
defendants, it is worth mentioning how insurance covers genetic tests,
which could also have been analyzed under the previous factor “burden
on defendants.” Insurance coverage for WES and WGS is spotty.215
Even when patients have positive-disease symptoms and look for a
related genotype, insurance coverage for genetic tests is “uncertain.”216
The billing director for Ambry Genetics—the first commercial lab to
offer whole exome sequencing—said insurance coverage is “all over the
map.”217
Genetic tests are sometimes paid for as part of an inpatient
hospitalization when patients have a debilitating disorder and are
looking for the genetic cause. 218 Otherwise, genetic testing for a present
disorder is paid partly by insurance and partly by the patient. If the
patient is an outpatient, in some cases, the ordering physician chooses
the clinical laboratory based on “out-of-pocket expense to patients by
comparing the costs between laboratories based on patients’ insurance.”219
The argument for insurance coverage is greater when someone is on
a diagnostic odyssey, because present clinical need motivates the test.
In our case, paying for follow-up tests to assess the clinical validity of
a potentially significant SF has a much more attenuated connection to

215. GENOMEWEB, supra note 12.
216. David Bick, et al., Successful Application of Whole Genome Sequencing
in a Medical Genetics Clinic, 6 J. PEDIATRIC GENETICS 61, 76 2017.
217. See Steenhuysen, supra note 16.
218. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMMITTEE
ON GENETICS, HEALTH, AND SOCIETY REPORT ON COVERAGE AND
REIMBURSEMENT OF GENETIC TESTS AND SERVICES A6 (2006), available at:
https://osp.od.nih.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/CR_report.pdf.
219. Alejandro Iglesias et al., The Usefulness of Whole-exome Sequencing in
Routine Clinical Practice, 16 GENETICS IN MED. 922, 931 (2014).

258

Health Matrix·Volume 28·Issue 1·2018
Needles, Haystacks and Next-Generation Genetic Sequencing

present clinical care. Therefore, insurance is even less likely to cover it.
As a senior medical director for Aetna insurance stated in 2014, some
of whole-genome sequencing is still in the “early stages” of analytic and
clinical validity.220 Currently, the lack of standards on ensuring quality
control, interpreting, and validating results makes it unlikely private
insurers will cover this test.221 Medicare does not.222 While some insurance companies—even Medicaid—may initially cover genetic testing for
patients on diagnostic odysseys, this is due to the low volume of
requests.223 Scant private coverage may subsidize the many claims
insurers deny. But, “[a]s use of the new technology has grown, a number
of insurers, including Blue Cross Blue Shield, have reacted by putting
the brakes on reimbursement.”224 Dr. Allen Bale is the director of the
DNA Diagnostic Lab at Yale School of Medicine. Since 2011, he has
seen a 500 percent increase in orders for exome sequencing.225
Two major health plans have started developing policies for future
coverage, but currently deny most requests due to the “experimental
and unproven” nature of WES and WGS.226 As with all insurance
coverage decisions, future coverage depends on the extent to which the
results of the testing are analytically and clinically valid and clinically
actionable.227 If the information translates into a “measured improved
health outcome,” insurance will more likely cover these tests.228 But
insurers will probably restrict coverage for WES and WGS to “patients
with disorders of suspected genetic etiology but no obvious diagnosis,”
and “patients with a suspected diagnosis that could involve one or more

220. Will Insurance Cover Genome Sequencing?, GENEWATCH, http://w
ww.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/genewatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?p
ageId=440 (last visited Mar. 13, 2018) [hereinafter GeneWatch].
221. Id.
222. Dylan Scott, Calls Intensity to Get Medicare to Pay for Genetic
Sequencing Tumors, STAT (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.statnews.com
/2016/01/26/gene-sequencing-medicare-tumors/.
223. Konstantinos N. Lazardis et al., Outcome of Whole Exome Sequencing for
Diagnostic Odyssey Cases of an Individualized Medicine Clinic: The Mayo
Clinic Experience, 91 MAYO CLINIC PROCEEDINGS 297, 297 (2016).
224. See Steenhuysen, surpa note 16 (“[I]nsurance companies initially paid for
most of the tests, but as volume has increased, more claims are getting
denied. “There are some companies that are saying out and out, we won’t
cover this test.”).
225. See id.
226. See The Future of Genomic Medicine: Policy Implications for Research
and Medicine, NAT’L HUMAN GENOME RESEARCH INST. (Nov. 16,
2005), https://www.genome.gov/17516574/the-future-of-genomic- medici
ne-policy-implications-for-research-and-medicine/.
227. Steenhuysen, supra note 16.
228. GeneWatch, supra note 221.
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genes.”229 So insurance will not routinely cover the cost of a follow-up
test to confirm the presence of an SF because it is not pursued due to
a present health disorder.230 Without a test to confirm existence of an
SF, the SF may not be clinically actionable due to the poor analytic
validity of WES and WGS.
The absence of adequate liability insurance, the potential for vast
liability for intangible harm, and the unavailability of reimbursement
from the plaintiff’s health insurance mitigate against imposing a duty
to warn on laboratories. While future laboratory professional insurance
might cover this litigation, it is the present availability of insurance
that matters. If imposing a duty requires insurance coverage to expand,
this suggests the duty is too burdensome and does not respond to a
foreseeable and presently insurable risk.

VII. To Whom Would the Duty Be Owed?
Even if the law imposed a duty to warn on laboratories, to whom
would the laboratory owe a duty? While the precise individual need not
be named, courts have limited the duty to warn to “readily identifiable”
individuals.231 In Thompson v. County of Alameda, a juvenile delinquent
murdered a child after his release from a county-correctional facility.232
The victim’s parents brought a wrongful death action against the
county, claiming that it should have warned them, the local police, or
“parents . . . within the immediate vicinity of the juvenile’s residence”
of a potentially violent offender’s release.233 The court found that the
county did not have a duty to warn these groups because “the duty to
warn depends upon and arises from the existence of a prior threat to a
specific identifiable victim.”234 In this case, the juvenile delinquent’s
threats were non-specific and the court declined to impose upon the
county an affirmative duty to warn such a “large amorphous public
group of potential targets.”235 Many state courts have agreed, requiring
specific threats against readily identifiable victims before a duty
arises.236 As one Ohio court put it, “the ‘readily identifiable victim’ rule
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. Emerich, 720 A.2d at 1040.
232. Thompson v. Cty. Of Alameda, 614 P.2d 728, 738 (Cal. 1980).
233. Id. at 730.
234. Id. at 738.
235. Id. at 728; Thompson v. Cty. of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 758, 614 P.2d
728 (1980).
236. Allison L. Almason, Personal Liability Implications of the Duty to Warn
Are Hard Pills to Swallow: From Tarasoff to Hutchinson v. Patel and
Beyond, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 471, 479 (1997); see Sheerin
v. State, 434 N.W.2d 633, 636 (Iowa 1989); Rogers v. S.C. Dep’t of Parole
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is born, lives, and grows in failure-to-warn cases.”237And a Minnesota
court further clarified that the “duty to warn is not owed to statistically
probable victims, but rather to specifically targeted victims.”238 A
Florida court extended the duty to a third party where the court—in
evaluating the risk of genetic disease—found that where a physician’s
obligations runs to people other than the patient and the physician
“knows of the existence of those third parties, then the physician’s duty
runs to those third parties.”239
While some courts require that the perpetrator specifically name
the intended victim to impose a duty to warn them, not every state
follows this law.240 But the courts hold firm to the concept of foreseeability; the narrow class of persons to be warned must be foreseeable
and reasonably identifiable, even if the ultimate plaintiff has not
already been individually identified.241 Thus, in Alaska the high court
wrote that “we see no reason to predicate liability wholly on the state’s
ability to predict the victim’s name. A victim may be ‘foreseeable’
without being specifically identifiable.”242
Courts have applied the same reasoning outside of the context of
warning of violent offenders. In a case where the plaintiff claims the
defendant should have warned plaintiff that having sex with his wife—
who was having an affair with defendant—could lead him to acquire a
sexually-transmitted disease, the court found that a spouse was a
foreseeable plaintiff and so a duty to warn was created.243 But the court
cautioned that the law will not impose liability on a defendant related
“to any and all persons with whom she may have sexual contact.”244
The duty to warn extends only to those individuals who are reasonably
foreseeable.
In the context of SFs, this suggests that laboratories should not
have to spend a great deal of time or resources identifying the patients
& Cmty. Corr., 464 S.E.2d 330, 332 (S.C. 1995); Morton v. Prescott, 564
So. 2d 913, 916 (Ala. 1990); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302, 307 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1995); Leonard v. Latrobe Area Hosp., 625 A.2d. 1228 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1993); Peck v. Counseling Serv., 499 A.2d 422 (Vt. 1985);
Bardoni v. Kim, 390 N.W.2d 218, 307 (Mich. App. 1986).
237. See Estates of Morgan v. Fairfield Family Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.
3d 284, 310, (Ohio 1997).
238. Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 20, 26 (Minn. 1982).
239. Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 1995).
240. See Limon v. Gonzaba, 940 S.W.2d 236, 239 (Tex. App. 1997).
241. James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 891892 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).
242. Div. of Corr., Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs. v. Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121,
1129 (Alaska 1986) superseded by State, Dep’t of Corr. v. Cowles, 151
P.3d 353, 363 (Alaska 2006).
243. Mussivand v. David, 544 N.E.2d 265 (Ohio 1989).
244. Id.at 273.
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or relatives of patients. While courts are willing to impose greater
burdens on defendants to warn third parties of imminent, physical
violence, courts are not as likely to require laboratories to re-contact
the patient for the telephone numbers and names of the patient’s
relatives, to disclose a non-imminent risk. Would the lab need to search
the family history records of the patient to find contact information for
relatives? This also seems to require too much legwork and human
resources to be considered “readily identifiable,” given that the law
would expect the laboratory to do this for every person who submits a
tissue sample and receives an SF.

VIII. Patient Confidentiality Should Not Be
Breached When There is No Risk of Imminent Physical
Violence
Because of patient privacy—protected through the common law
and state and federal statutes like HIPAA—the laboratory must ensure
that if they disclose SFs to patients or relatives, it does not violate the
patient’s privacy or confidentiality.245 One early court that dealt with
the duty to warn of heritable diseases transferred the duty to the
patient (in genetics, the reference patient is called the “proband.”)246 In
Pate v. Threlkel, the court found that the provider discharges his duty
to warn non-patients through informing the proband—with a recommendation that he pass the risk information along to the at-risk third
party.247 Because “the patient ordinarily can be expected to pass on the
warning,” the physician does not need to tell the third-party relatives
themselves of a genetic mutation.248 In so holding, the court instructed
that requiring physicians to:
seek out and warn various members of the patient’s family would
often be difficult or impractical and would place too heavy a
burden upon the physician. Thus, we emphasize that in any
circumstances in which the physician has a duty to warn of a
genetically transferable disease, that duty will be satisfied by
warning the patient.249

Of course, this makes several inappropriate assumptions. First, it
assumes that the family dynamics are healthy and that communication
245. US DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN, SUMMARY OF THE HIPAA SECURITY
RULE, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/security/laws-regu
lations/index.html (last updated July 26, 2013).
246. Pate 661 So.2d at 278.
247. See id at 282 (holding that a duty to warn patient of condition that could
be passed on to daughter).
248. Id.
249. Id.
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lines are open. Second, it assumes that the proband will correctly pass
along the information, with the appropriate clinical suggestions for
follow-up. But in some families, the proband cannot be expected to
accurately pass along the warning.250
In Safer v. Estate of Pack, the New Jersey court analogized
imposing a duty to warn of genetic risks to a duty to warn of serious
infectious diseases.251 Safer held that while imposing broad duties to
non-patients might lead to confusion or unfairness, in the case of
warning of “avertible risk from genetic causes, by definition a matter of
familial concern” the burden is narrow enough to be workable and
just.252
The court further held that the “duty “extend[s] beyond the
interests of a patient to members of the immediate family of the patient
who may be adversely affected by a breach of that duty.”253 In Safer,
the duty to the non-patient relative was considered discharged by
informing the patient of the risk, and assuming that the patient would
share this information with his relative. However, the court reserved
the possibility of one day breaching a proband’s confidentiality to warn
a non-patient, if there were some indication the patient would not tell
their relative.254

250. Studies have found that positive test results are more likely to be disclosed
than negative or uninformative results. White females, who have a higher
income, and have a personal history of cancer, are more likely to disclose
genetic test results with family members. Probands are also more likely
to share their results if they perceive that relatives are emotionally ready
and able to understand the information, they are close with the relative,
and they think it will help their relative’s clinical decision-making. In
terms of psychological factors, probands are also more likely to share
results with family if they report greater self-efficacy for health
management and less fatalism over cancer prevention. See Kelly Kohut et
al., Should Healthcare Providers have a Duty to Warn Family Members
of Individuals with an HNPCC- causing Mutation? A Survey of Patients
from the Ontario Familial Colon Cancer Registry, 44 J. MED. GENETICS
404, 405 (2007).
251. Safer, 667 A.2d at 1192 (“In terms of foreseeability especially, there is no
essential difference between the type of genetic threat at issue here and
the menace of infection, contagion or a threat of physical harm. The
individual or group at risk is easily identified, and substantial future harm
may be averted or minimized by a timely and effective warning.” (internal
citations omitted)).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1192,93 (Given that the case was decided the same year that HIPAA
was passed, but before the regulations were issued, we cannot be sure if
it would find the same way today.).
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Whether breaching a patient’s common-law confidentiality protections is justified requires the law to balance competing interests.255
Recall that in Tarasoff, the defendant-psychotherapist did not directly
warn Tatiana Tarasoff because he feared breaching his patient’s right
to privacy.256 The court famously stated that “the public policy favoring
protection of the confidential character of patient-psychotherapist
communications must yield to the extent to which disclosure is essential
to avert danger to others. The protective privilege ends where the public
peril begins.”257 Thus, when it comes to the duty of psychotherapists to
warn third-parties, the law should balance confidentiality against public
safety, and public safety is paramount. But risks of non-disclosure of
SFs are much less imminent and severe, suggesting that the balance
might tilt in favor of respecting common-law confidentiality.258
Physicians and laboratories should also ensure that they do not
violate the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule or other state-privacy statutes.
Rather than pointing to their patient’s genetic mutation as the basis
for the disclosure to a relative, providers could simply state that “it has
come to our attention that you might be at risk for a genetic mutation,
and if you would like more information, you will need to follow-up with
your primary care provider.” But patients may not heed this sort of
vague warning, and thus, it may not prevent future harm.
Because this sort of disclosure is likely too imprecise to be helpful,
providers might avail themselves of an HIPAA Privacy Rule’s publicsafety exception. But the “public safety” exception will not work
because it only allows disclosure of protected health information to
“avert a serious threat to health or safety” such as the type of risk
present in the Tarasoff case.259 A physician might disclose protectedhealth information if she believes, in good faith, that the disclosure is
“necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the
health or safety of a person or the public”; and “is to a person or persons
reasonably able to prevent or lessen the threat.”260 Where the risk is of
255. Nick Nicholas, Confidentiality, Disclosure and Access to Medical Records,
9 OBSTETRICIAN & GYNECOLOGIST 257, 260 (2007).
256. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 346.
257. Id. at 347.
258. Indeed, at least two state courts have recognized that conducting additional
analyses on an unwitting patient’s tissue sample might constitute the tort of
intrusion upon seclusion See Doe, 748 A.2d at 340; see also, Havasupai
Tribe of Havasupai Reservation v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063,
1076 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).
259. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(j) (2002).
260. Id.; see also, DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OFFICE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS, A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER’S GUIDE TO THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE: COMMUNICATING WITH A PATIENT’S FAMILY, FRIENDS, OR OTHERS
INVOLVED IN THE PATIENT’S CARE, 2, https://www.hhs.gov/sites/def
ault/files/provider_ffg.pdf (last visited March 4, 2018).
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imminently contracting contagious disease, courts may require physicians to breach confidentiality and warn family members that the
patient is contagious.261
But the problem is of course, with the word “imminent.” Even if
the genetic disease is serious and treatment is effective and available, a
court should not allow disclosure of genetic risks under this exception.
As Mark Rothstein has pointed out, “imminence” is a high bar; it
“implies such immediacy that many mental health professionals might
believe that even a deeply troubled and dangerous person who made
credible threats did not expressly indicate that he or she was planning
to take imminent action to carry out the threats.”262 Though there is
not much case law, disclosure is inappropriate unless the risk was of
serious, imminent physical violence.263 Defendants should only breach
confidentiality when the risk is an imminent one.264 Under this standard,
even highly-penetrant and serious genetic diseases are not imminent
enough to warrant disclosure.
Is there an alternative route for disclosure that complies with
HIPAA? One possibility is not obvious, but relies on the ordinary
treatment exception.265 The HIPAA privacy rule allows a covered entity
to disclose PHI “for its own treatment” or “for treatment activities of
a health care provider.”266 But the regulations do not specify for whom
the treatment must be intended.267 It might come as a surprise to many
that the plain-language reading of HIPAA regulations may permit the
disclosure of a proband’s PHI to treat the proband’s first-degree
relative.268 The disclosure cannot be merely in the form of a warning,
but must be part of the relative’s treatment plan.
Because laboratories could disclose an SF for treatment purposes,
HIPAA may not create the anticipated hurdles to disclosure. But there
261. Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So.2d 752, 753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
262. Rothstein, supra note 107, at 107.
263. See Kuligoski v. Brattleboro Retreat, 156 A.3d 436, 458-59 (Vt. 2016), as
amended for clarification on Oct. 10, 2016.
264. US DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, WHERE THE HIPAA PRIVACY
RULE APPLIES, DOES IT PERMIT A HEALTH CARE PROVIDER TO DISCLOSE
PROTECTED HEALTH INFORMATION (PHI) ABOUT A PATIENT TO LAW
ENFORCEMENT, FAMILY MEMBERS, OR OTHERS IF THE PROVIDER BELIEVES
THE PATIENT PRESENTS A SERIOUS DANGER TO SELF OR OTHERS?,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/520/does-hipaapermit-a-health-care-provider-to-disclose-information-if-the-patient-is-adanger/index.html (last updated July 26, 2013).
265. 45 C.F.R. §164.506(a) (2002).
266. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2002).
267. See id.
268. 45 C.F.R. §164.506(a) (2002)(I thank my colleague Leslie Francis for her
careful read of the HIPAA regulations, and for pointing this out to me.).
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is still the possibility of tort liability for public-disclosure of private
facts if the physician discloses the proband’s non-imminent risk. As the
only cases to require a breach of confidentiality involved specific threats
of imminent physical violence, judges should not require a breach of
common-law privacy principles where the warning is limited to a
potential for future genetic disease.269
Given the family dynamics, emotions, and lack of provider-patient
relationship between the laboratory and the proband’s relative, it would
be reasonable to consider the physician or laboratory to have discharged
their tort duty once they inform the proband—or ordering physician—
of the risk, with a commendation from the provider that he or she
should tell their family members. If the provider informs the proband
that the risk is genetic and instructs the proband to warn close family
members, laboratories and providers should not breach the proband’s
common-law confidentiality rights and reach out to the proband’s
relative. The provider and the proband is better-positioned to know
how to inform the relative.
Most probands do share genetic test results with first-degree
relatives, so the ordering physician may presume this.270 But the likelyhood of disclosing to family depends on individual variables such as
gender, education, family history of cancer, and psychological feelings
of self-efficacy and optimism.271 And 10.5 percent of relatives who
learned of their proband’s genetic results could not remember the result
269. The key here would be whether the genetic risk information is considered
private enough such that disclosure would be offensive or objectionable to
a reasonable person. Typically, the disclosure of private health information counts for this tort. See, See, Richard E. Kaye, Invasion of Privacy
by Public Disclosure of Private Facts , 103 AM. JUR. Proof of Facts
FED.3RD 159 (2008).
270. Mary Daly et al., Communicating Genetic Test Results Within the Family:
Is it Lost in Translation? A Survey of Relatives in the Randomized Six-step
Study, 15 FAMILY CANCER 697, 698 (2016) (“[O]verall, probands reported
sharing their test result with 80 % of 838 eligible FDRs [first degree
relatives].”).
271. Darquise Lafrenière, Family Communication Following BRCA1/2 Genetic
Testing: A Close Look at the Process, 22 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 323,
323 (2013) (“Given the nature of modern families and complexity of the
genetic information, some patients may consider communication difficult
or impossible. Although evidence suggests that most individuals share test
results with first-degree relatives soon after notification, genetic service
providers are likely to encounter patients who will not notify a sizeable
number of relatives for whom genetic information could have significant
implications. Individuals may experience difficulty recalling and
understanding information received during genetic counseling sessions,
which raises concerns about the accuracy of information conveyed to atrisk relatives.”); see also, Ashley Elrick et al., Psychosocial and Clinical
Factors Associated with Family Communication of Cancer Genetic Test
Results among Women Diagnosed with Breast Cancer at a Young Age,
26 J. GENETIC COUNSELING 173, 181 (2017).
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later. This group was much more likely to be male.272 If the provider
has reason to believe that the proband will not tell their relatives about
a SF linked to highly penetrant colon cancer —perhaps because the
proband is male and is not optimistic about cancer treatment—then
the provider, but not the laboratory, might have an obligation to warn
the proband’s readily identifiable relatives based upon the “special
relationship” recognized between physicians and patients. But because
there is no special relationship between the laboratory and the proband,
it seems hard to stretch that arms-length relationship to require that
the laboratory do more than disclose SFs to the ordering physician or
the proband.
Genetic-risk information is not like imminent-violence-risk information or the risk of injuring oneself. Almost anyone would welcome a
warning that they are at risk of serious, imminent violence or injury.
No rational person desires to be shot or cut. But not everyone wants to
know if they are at risk of an uncertain genetic disease. Even if there is
a well-tolerated treatment available, a non-trivial number of people
would not want to know of this distant threat.273 Judges should not
require a breach of patient confidentiality when there is not the kind of
serious peril to public safety at issue in Tarasoff.274

IX. CONCLUSION
The Rowland factors are not dissimilar from the ACMG working
group’s criteria on SFs, or even from the factors insurance companies
use to determine whether to cover genetic tests.275 Each asks whether
the cost is worth the benefit. The factors can determine whether, on
average, imposing a duty to warn on a laboratory strikes the right
balance of fairness between the defendant’s need-to-pay and the
plaintiff’s entitlement to compensation.
Compared to the more traditional duty-to-warn cases, the case for
laboratories directly warning plaintiffs of SFs is far weaker. First,
laboratories have no special relationship with patients seeking WES or
272. Daly et al., supra note 271, at 699 (“Of interest, 10.5 % reported that
they were told the test result but were not able to remember it. Those
relatives reporting that they did not remember the test result were
significantly more likely to be male gender than female gender (57 vs.
43 %, p > 0.001).”)).
273. HARVARD T.H. CHAN SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH, THE PUBLIC
EDITING, TESTING, AND THERAPY, 5 (2016).
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274. Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 339.
275. Rowland, 443 P.2d at 564, Kalia, supra note 40, at 250; Andrew Hresko
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WGS for an unrelated disease. Second, a physician—with whom the
patient does have a special relationship and for whom liability for nondisclosure is more appropriate—mediates the results. Of course, it
might be precisely because patients are looking to sue someone other
than their physician that they file a complaint against the laboratory.
When something goes wrong and the patient is injured, the laboratory
provides an option to hold an entity accountable, especially when the
physician, who may have also made a mistake, is a friend. But it is
precisely because the laboratory is removed from the patient’s direct
experience that the law should not hold it accountable to the same
degree as the ordering physician. While liability for failing to follow-up
on an actionable SF could attach to the physician, liability for the
laboratory makes much less sense.
We currently have limited information on the likelihood that a
monogenic mutation will develop into disease, and the information we
have likely inflates this value for those who are symptom-free. Thus,
presence of a genetic mutation does not predict the kind of foreseeable,
imminent, and serious risk giving rise to a common-law duty to warn
for laboratories. Additionally, it would be asking too much for courts
to expect laboratories to internalize the costs of this new duty. The labs
are likely not insured for this risk and have no means to bill for the
additional resources it would take to ensure results are valid and
correctly interpreted. The difficulty proving causation for a concrete
injury also mitigates against imposing a tort duty to warn as a matter
of law.276 Given the ambiguous nature of an SF from WES or WGS, it
is preferable to have any SFs delivered by an ordering physician and in
the context of clinical care. To impose liability on a laboratory to
directly warn its patients would engage in the tempting imposition of
tort obligations where harms are conceivable ex ante, but hardly
reasonably foreseeable. Currently, the significant cost burden on
defendants further mitigates against imposing on genetics laboratories
a duty to warn patients of their SFs.

276. David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 1992 UTAH L.
REV. 1335, 1343 (1992).
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